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S Y N O P S I S
This thesis undertakes theoretical and empirical analysis of 
the effects of protection on resource allocation in Iraq and considers the 
implications of growth in protected industries on economic welfare*
Chapter I describes the structure of the manufacturing sector and its 
salient features. Chapter II discusses and analyses the government policies 
to promote industrialisation. Chapter III examines the effects of protection 
on resource allocation in terms of the standard theory of effective protection. 
Following that an alternative model is introduced: this latter incorporates 
the main features of the Iraqi industrial sector, namely the role of the 
government in regulating the growth of firms and entry of new firms, and 
administrative pricing and absence of competitive forces; this model 
predicts that industry growth is influenced by the height of its price- 
cost margins. The estimates of the various measures of protection, the 
price-cost margins and resource allocation are presented in Chapter IV.
In Chapter V the two models are tested by using regression analysis and 
their results compared. It was found that the model!that incorporates 
the price-cost margins explains industrial growth better than the standard 
model of effective protection.
Chapter VI considers the welfare implications of growth in protected 
industries in terms of the standard theory of immiserizing growth. Then, 
in Chapter VII, I examine the welfare implications derived from my alternative 
model on the Iraqi economy. Finally, using these models I estimate the 
likelihood of welfare losses from growth in protected industries. The 
results show that the share of v/elfare reducing industries in total manufacturing 
output ranges from 22%-39% according to our model while the corresponding 
share implied by the. effective tariff model is 53%.
The implication of the study is that the protection to high 
cost domestic industries has caused welfare losses and-that in future 
pGi'j.oo.s strrcter economic criteria should no useo lr< -die cnolce or. mousuries 
to be set up and encouraaed.
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C H A P T E R  I 
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR IN IRAQ
1.I Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the main characteristics of the manufacturing
sector and its growth and structural change during 1962-74. I also examine
the relative importance of the private and public enterprises in manufacturing
industry and discuss their pricing policies.
Manufacturing activitiy in Iraq is concentrated mainly in the
agricultural processing activities and in the production of light consumer
goods and construction materials. In addition to those there are some
industries producing intermediate products, e.g., petroleum and chemical
products. Apart from a few industries like cement, ^  date processing and
petroleum products, most of the others cater almost exclusively for the
domestic market? however, most industries depend on imports for their
supplies of raw materials and intermediate products. A large number of the
(2)
establishments are small, employing less than ten persons: in 1962 such
establishments accounted fbr about 95 per cent of the total number of
establishments. They employ relatively labour-intensive techniques so
that their importance in terms of total output is less than in terms of
employment: in 1961 their share in terms of these measures was respectively
(3)
one-fifth and one-third.
^  In 1968, the exports of cement were about 4.4 m Iraqi Dinar (ID) which 
account for about half of the total output and three quarters of total 
manufactured exports (excluding crude oil). Exports were made possible 
with the help of the export subsidy and other incentives, given partly 
to avoid problems of excess capacity during the 1950s. -The exports are 
sent particularly to the neighbouring Gul-f states.
(2)
x The definition used by the Industrial Census for the Size of industries 
is that small scale establishments are those employing less than 10 workers 
whereas large scale establishments are those employing 10 workers or more.
(3>‘These figures are derived from the Statistical Pocket Book, 1960-70,
Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), Table 41, P. 100.
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1.2 Growth and Structural Change in Manufacturing Industry
The manufacturing sector has achieved a relatively high rate of
growth of output over the 1962-72 period, though growth has not been even
throughout the entire period. The average rate of growth of net output,
during 1962-72, in constant (1966) prices, was 7.7 per cent per annum; this
is slightly higher than the growth of GDP for the same period. ^  However,
manufacturing output has been rising faster during the later part of the above
period; this was due partly to the increasing emphasis by the government on
industrialisation and partly to the increasing oil revenues that were fused
to finance increased industrial investment: during 1969-72, the average
(2)
compound rate of growth, at 1966 prices, was as high as 17.6 per cent 
per annum.
Table 1.1 gives the quantum index numbers of output by seven 
major industry groups for 1969 and 1974 (where 1962 = 100) and the rates 
of change of output during the periods 1962-69, 1969-74 and 1962-74.
The index of physical output for 1974 stood at 221.7, indicating an average 
rate of growth of 10.1 per cent per annum since 1962. The growth was much 
more marked after 1969: the growth rate during 1969-74 was 16.1 per cent 
while that for the earlier period 1962-69 was only'5.9 per cent. The highest 
rates of growth were achieved by chemicals, clothing and footwear and textiles 
On the other hand, the growth rate of petroleum refining, non metalic minerals 
and food, beverage and tobacco were lender than for manufacturing as a whole.
As in the case of total manufacturing, growth of output in each of the 
seven industry sectors was much faster during 1969-74 than during 1962-69.
^ T h e  corresponding rate of growth of GDP, at 1966 prices, was 6.9 per 
cent per annum for the above period. These rates of growth are derived 
from The National Income Estimates, Preliminary Report, 1965-69, CSO, 
Ministry of Planning, Table 2,'and the Statistical Pocket Book, 1974,
CSO, Table 49, p. 77. Available figures for manufacturing output and . 
National Income do not go beyond 1972. \\r«Aavc »
(2)Output figures for 1970-72, at 1966 prices, were estimated by applying the 
implicit deflator for 1969 to the 1970-72 output figures at current prices.
Quantum Index Numbers for Output of Manufacturing Industries, 
1969 and 1974 and Average Rates of Change
(1962 = 100)
No. INDUSTRY 1969
(1)
1974
(2)
Average
1962-69
(3)
Rate of Change
1969-74 1962- 
(4) (5) .
1 Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 120.8 175.9 2,9 11.0 6.3
2 Textiles 137.5 268.0 5.4 26.1 14.C
3 Clothes and Footwear 168.4 303.5 9.8 27.0 16.9
4 Petroleum refining 159.9 215.0 8.6 11.0 9.6
5 Chemical industries 188.8 310.3 12.7 24.3 17.5
6 Non-metalic industries 139.4 182.4 5.6 8.6 6.9
7 Miscellaneous 127.6 330.3 3.9 40.5 19.2
8 General Index 141.3 221.7 5.9 17.1 10.]
Notes: 1) The average rates of change was obtained by dividing the difference
between the indexes of base and target years by the number of years for 
each period.
2) Miscellaneous includes printing, metal furniture, carpentry, tanning, 
domestic utensils and black smithing.
Sources: Columns (1) and (2) are derived from:
(1) The Quantum Index Numbers for Manufacturing Industries, Central
Statistical Organisation, Ministry of Planning, Iraq, 1972, Table 2.
(2) Iraq in Figures, CSO, Ministry of Planning (a pamphlet) .
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The increasing share of the Chemical Industry is due to the fact 
that Iraq is an oil producing country and, thus, the availability of basic 
materials e.g., crude oil and gas gives the country a comparative 
advantage in chemical industries. The increasing share of Textiles and 
Clothing may be explained by the fact that the technology of the industry 
is easier to imitate, and, being in the early stage of its development 
domestic production is still a very small proportion of demand.
In terms of the two major industry groups i.e. consumer and 
capital good industries, the share of the former had slightly increased
during the 1960s. This reflects that in the early stage of industrialisation
/
planners have a preference for these industries since they are easier
and quicker to establishe than others.^ By the late 1960s, however,
it was widely realised in Iraq that industrial investment had been concentratec
in consumer goods. The National Development Plan of 1970-74 therefore
aimed to increase the share of capital good industries: projects like
petroleum refining, chemical industries, cement, aluminium plant and
machine tool production were planned.
1.3 The Public and Private Sectors in Manufacturing Industry
Although the public sector in industry in Iraq had its beginning
in the early 1950s, with the setting up of electricity, sugar refining,
cement, cigarettes, spinning and weaving and oil refining industries,
it was not until the mid-1960s that the government began to take an active
(2)role in industry. With the Nationalisation Programme of 1964 about 
twenty seven large industrial firms were taken over from the private sector;
(1)This point has also been made in the context of Egypt's industrialisation, 
See R. Mabro, The Egyptian Economy 1952-72, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1974, p. 146.
(2 )In July 1964 the "Socialist Lav/s" were passed which nationalised large 
industrial firms, some commercial firms and all the Banks and Insurance 
Companies in Iraq. See Law 99 of July 1964, Iraqi Gazette, No, 975 of 
July 1964,
these firms relate to the cement and other construction materials,
textiles, vegetable oils and soaps, cigarettes, footwear and leather
and paper industries. Since then the public sector has been expanding
at a faster rate than the private sector: as seen from Table 1.2,
between 1964 and 1974 the output of the former increased from ID 20.5m
to ID 95.2m i.e. more than four-fold while that of the latter increased
from ID 43.1m to ID 90.4m i.e. only two-fold. Moreover the former's
share in total manufacturing increased from about one-third to over one-
half during the same period. In fact a sizeable proportion of output in
the private sector is carried out in very small establishments^;
so if the comparisons are limited to large establishments the relative
(2)share of the public sector would be even higher.
104 Competition and Pricing Policies
An important feature of the manufacturing sector is that the 
forces of market competition are hampered from influencing product prices0 
Foreign competition is restricted by import tariffs, quotas and foreign 
exchange allocations0 Competition amongst domestic firms is restricted 
partly by the large and increasing share of the public sector and partly 
by the government's industrial policies affecting the private and public 
sectorso First the private and public sectors are largely dominated by only 
a few firmse A sample of fourteen important large-scale industries in 1969 
showed that six of them had at most two firms each, and eleven of them 
had at most five firms: refined sugar and bicycles were produced by single
^  In 1962, the value added of small establishments was about ID 13m, 
making up about one-third of total value added of the private sector.
(2) ^If small establishments are excluded the share of the public sector
in total industrial value added increases from 28 per cent to 36 per cent.
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TABLE 1.2
Value Added in Manufacturing Industry by 
Public and Private Sectors: 
their percentage shares and rates of growth 
1962, 1964-74
million 
(Current prices in/IDs)
Year PublicSector *6
Private
Sector % Total
2*
1962* 16.4 28.4 41.4 71.6 57.8 100
1964 20.6 32.3 43.1 67.7 63.7 100
1965 26.2 37.8 43.2 62.2 69.4 100
1966 29.7 39.8 45.0 60.2 74.7 100
1967 31.0 37.2 52.3 62.8 83.3 100
1968 39.3 41.5 55.3 58.5 94.6 100
1969 40.3 39.1 62.7 60.1 103.0 100
1970 48.2 41.6 67.8 58.4 116.0 100
1971 53.0 40.8 72.8 59.2 129.8 100
1972 67.6 46.3 78.3 43.7 145.9 100
1973 80.4 48.9 84.1 51.1 164.5 100
1974 95.2 51.3 90.4 48,7 185.6 100
Compound Rates of Growth
1964-69 14.4% 7.8% 10.0%
1969-74 18.8% 7.6% 12.5%
1964-74 16.5% 7.7% 11.3%
Sources: Derived from "The Manufacturing Sector", Report No. 1, Document No. 4,
Working Party on the National Development Plan 1975-80,
Ministry of Planning, Iraq, Table No. 4, p. 96. .
*Figures for .1962 were calculated from the Industrial Census 1962, CSO, 
Ministry of Planning, Iraq, Table A, 22 and 38.
firms while asbestos, Radio and Tv assembly, cigarettes and matches,
(1)were produced by only two firms„ This concentration ox manuractunng 
output restricts competition and encourages monopolistic practices0 
In fact since most of the large and medium sized firms are in the public 
sector, particularly since 1964, the concentration of ownership is even 
greater than suggested by the above listQ This concentration is perpetuated 
by government policies; since investment by private enterprises requires 
licenses entry of new firms as well as efficiency-dnduced expansion 
of existing firms is discouraged,.
In addition, competition is restricted by the system of administrative 
pricing of products0 Administrative pricing began in 1961-with the establish­
ment of the Permanent Committee for Protection0 The Committee fixes 
the domestic prices for those private firms that have been given protection
from import competition; moreover, changes in the price requires the
(2)approval of the Ministry of Economics,, The object of this was to 
protect consumers from undue price rises0 Although there are no well 
defined criteria for setting these prices the general aim is to cover 
costs and earn a profit margin,,
Pricing decisions for the public sector firms are made either by
(i) the enterprises themselves (though subject to the approval of the 
Ministry of Industry) or (ii) the Board of Directors of the State Organisatioj
r— r~ ir~ ir-~i» i i - ~i i—11 r r» • i—it—ii~ i—i— 11—ti—f  r~ i r ~ n * - r r  T~—'---------------------1 -------1—r— •■-1 — —— y  ■ ■ r - r r i n — r n —t—r tT—it—t— r-~r— i r—t ....  .........
(1) This information was derived from The Industrial Census of 1969,
CSO, Ministry of Planning, Iraq.
(2) A.K. Hilmi, "The Experience of Iraq, Inter-regional Seminar on 
Selected Aspects of Industrial Policy, U.N. Economic and Social 
Office in Beirut, Lebanon, January, 1971, pp 36-37 (mimeographed) .
of Trade. Here boo prices are formulated basically on the basis of cost
0)
plus profit margins. The method of cost estimation lor tne purpose
of price determination often varied between the different enterprises;
some of them used the historical cost, others used the replacement cost
(2)
while some enterprises used the method of marginal costing. In addition
account is taken of the state of demand, the degree of competition from
(3)
the private sector and from competing imports and close substitutes.
The drawback of this pricing system is the lack of flexibility in adjusting 
to changes in costs and demand patterns and in import competition: 
there are some public sector industries whose products prices have not 
changed since they were nationalised in 1964.^
These pricing policies have important implications for the study 
of protection and resource allocation: since the standard model of protection 
assumes competititve pricing the existence of administrative pricing in 
Iraq would call for an alternative model of resource allocation; this will 
be dealt with in Chapter III.
(1) See A study of.Pricing of Manufacturing Products and Pricing Policies, 
The Ministry of Industry, Planning and Follow Up Section, April 1974, 
p. 25. The profit margin is determined as a percentage of the cost, 
taking into account, in some cases, the value of capital invested, 
see p. 5.
(2) Ibid. The historical cost method uses the actual costs, which have 
been spent in the past, as the basis for calculating production costs. 
See p. 29.
(3) U.N. Economic and Social Office in Beirut, Review and Appraisal
of the Process of Decision Making and Management in the Public Industria.' 
Enterprise in Iraq, (Nov, 1973), pp 16-17
(4) For the details of the changes in the prices of various manufactured 
products see A Study of Pricing of Manufacturing Products, op. cit. , 
Appendix Tables II.
CHAPTER IX
POLICIES TO PROMOTE INDUSTRIALISATION IN IRAO
The government policies that have been used to promote
industrialisation include import tariffs, quotas and tax exemptions.
This chapter discusses these policies.
Economic theory shows that there are only two arguments for
protection, namely, the terms of trade argument (i.e. the optimum
tariff) and the infant industry argument. In contrast national
governments often follow protection policies from a desire to foster
industrialisation per se. The rationale for protection in Iraq can be
best understood by first discussing its historical development. Since
the terms of trade argument is not relevant for a small country like
I r a q ^  the question is essentially whether the protected industries
were chosen on infant industry criteria.
2.1 Historical Development of Protection
The initial forms of protection was the tariff; quotas were
introduced subsequently and since the 1960s have been relied on more
heavily than the tariff.
a) Tariff Protection
Although the origin of the tariff system goes back to 1919,
the main features of the present tariff system were laid in Law No. 77
(2)
of 1955 and in an important amendment in 1962. An important feature
is that duties on machinery, semi processed inputs and raw materials
(3)
have been set at lower rates than those on final consumer goods.
(1) A small country like Iraq has no monopoly power in international 
trade and hence cannot influence the prices of its exports or imports.
(2) This amendment raised import duties on several competing imports 
and also widened the range of machinery which were exempted from 
customs duties in order to provide greater protection to domestic 
industries. See Law No. 30 at 1962
(3) See M.S. Hasan,The Economic Development of Iraq 1864-1958, Beirut, 
Al-Maktaba Al-Asria, 1965, p. 357 (Arabic).
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(1)
t have estimated the level of tariffs for each of 26 Industries '”* in 
1962 (incorporating the amendments introduced up to that year) accounting 
for about 45 per cent of total value added of large scale manufacturing.
The estimates are shown in Table 2.1. The average for all industries (except
(2) (3)
cigarettes) was 56 per cent. In general, consumer goods are
more heavily protected than intermediate goods and the latter, in turn,
have higher tariff protection than investment goods: the average rates
for these groups are 72 per cent, 26 per cent and 14 per cent respectively.
The broad structure of tariff protection is in line with that of some
other less developed countries. It also suggests that the effective
protection rates (i.e. protection to the value added) must be higher
(4)than that implied by the nominal rates alone, 
k) Quantitative Import Restrictions
Import restrictions, which initially had been resorted to 
mainly for balance of payments deficits, have since the 1958 Revaluation 
been introduced for the promotion of domestic industries. Policy makers 
felt that tariffs on their own were not effective in providing the 
necessary protection since consumers may have a preference for foreign 
products: quantitative controls were considered the only effective 
instrument for curbing imports. Admittedly in principle a sufficiently 
high tariff would be prohibitive? however the search for a sufficiently 
high rate may require frequent changes, since the magnitude of the import 
demand elasticities and the likely reactions of foreign suppliers may 
not be known with certainty, and this is difficult in Iraq because it 
involves time consuming legislative processes.
(1) In cases where an industry consists of a number of products the 
industry tariff rate was obtained as a simple average of the rates 
of the individual products.
(2) Duties on imported cigarettes are levied mainly for revenue purposes.
(3) Within the consumer good industries the food industries have the 
highest rates whereas textiles have the lowest rates. See Table 2.1.
(4) The estimates of the effective rates are found in Chapter IV.
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Table 2.1
Tariff Protection in Iraq's Manufacturing Industry, 1962
(percentages)
NO. INDUSTRY t.
3
-
Consumer Goods 97
1 Dairy Products 83
2 Grain milling 40
3 Macaroni 87
4 Biscuits and Sweets 212
5 Sugar manufacturing 77
6 Vegetable Oils 90
7 Soft drinks _ 100
8 Cigarettes 523
9 Cotton textiles 21
10 Woollen textiles 42
11 Rayon textiles 53
12 Vests and socks 43
13 Knitted clothing 32
14 Footwear 76
15 Carpentry 45
16 Cosmetics 75
17 Soaps 70
18 Matches 34
Intermediate Goods 26
19 Jute and Ropes 23
20 Wool pressing 21 ■
21 Tanning 40
22 Paper and products 20
Investment Goods 14
23 Cement 18
24 Tiles 7
25 Gypsum 11
26 Glass and products 20
74
Overall average
Note: The figures in brackets exclude the cigarettes industry from 
the average of consumer goods and from the overall average
Sources: Calculated from the Tariff Schedule and the Foreign Trade Statistics
2.2 The Criteria for Granting Protection
In 1961 a Permanent Committee for Protection was established,
within the Ministry of Economics, with members drawn from that Ministry,
the Ministries of Industry and Finance, the Iraqi Federation of Industries
and Baghdad Chamber of Commerce.^ The Committee receives applications
for protection from industrialists, and after visiting the factories
concerned, it prepares a report including recommendations to the Minister
of Economics, which he usually accepts. Protection is granted initially
for one year, at the end of which the case is reviewed? and if the
(2)committee is satisfied protection becomes permanent. When granting
protection the Committee usually also fixes the selling price of protected
(3)products. As Table 2.2 shows, between 1959 and 19/2 quantitative
protection has been granted to a total of 165 manufacturing products. Out
of this total 53 commodities were 'partially' protected i.e., by import
quotas and 112 commodities were 'completely' protected by an outright
ban on competing imports.
There have been few formal criteria or written directives to guide
the Committee. In general, however, the Committee's recommendations
(4)on protection are given on the following considerations:
(1) Domestic output should be sufficient to meet local demand at the 
existing price. •
(2) The selling prices of protected products must be lower or only 
slightly higher than those of imported products, presumably to
minimise the welfare loss of consumers.
(3) Domestic products should meet certain specifications and standards 
of quality.
(1) Central Statistical Organisation, Report of the Second Stage of the
Programme of Industrial Development Survey in Iraq, Ministry of Planning
volume 1, June 1971, p. 144. l(Vo\>\c} •
(2) F. Jalal, The Role of Government in the Industrialisation of Iraq,
1950-65, Frank Cass, 1972, p. 116.
(3) See Chapter I, section 1.4.
(4) For these criteria see A.K. Hilmi, op. cit., p. 116
13
Table 2.2
Industrial Products Completely Protected (ban) 
or Partially Protected (quotas) , 1959-72
Year Partially protected Completely protected Total
1959 a 39 39
1960 b 2 6 8
1961 b 6 4 10
1962 b 4 4 8
1963 b 4 5 9
1964 b 6 3 9
1965 b 7 12 19
1966 b 1 2 3
1967 b 6 17 - 23
1968 b 2 1 3
1969 a 3 7 10
1970 a 5 3 8
1971 a 5 8 13
1972 a 2 1 3
TOTAL 53 112 165
Sources: a) Compiled from tables in A. Al-Rubai, The Question of Industry
in Iraq and the Role of Private Sector and the Evaluation of ,
Incentives to Industry, Iraqi Federation of Industry, Economic
Section, 1972, pp 64--76 (Arabic)
b) Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1968, CSO, Ministry of Planning, 
Iraq, Table 305, p. 384
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If all the above requirements are met total protection is 
granted i.e., an outright ban is placed on comoetina imports. On the other 
hand, if some of the requirements cannot be met only ’partial* protection 
is provided, i.e. import quotas and/or tariffs are imposed; this may be 
for a limited period after which it will be reviewed.
This procedure may be criticised for the following reasons:
First, domestic demand, according to various committee reports, 
was defined as equal to the average annual imports plus domestic production 
sold over the past two or three years. Thus demand was not being measured 
in an ex ante sense but rather from an ex post view where demand always 
equals supply. This procedure implies that demand is price inelastic. 
Moreover, the committee did not allow for the effect of either income or 
population growth on demand.
Second, the prices used for their comparison are domestic wholesale
prices of home products and of competing imports. Strictly speaking in
accordance with the infant industry criteria ex-factory prices of domestic
products should be compared with c.i.f. landed prices of imports? this is
because the domestic market prices of imports are inflated by tariff
duties and other scarcity margins. Moreover, whereas the committee’s
cost comparisons pertained to cost at the time of investigation, some
considerations should have been given to the likely future costs. This is
particularly important as the infant industry argument bases the case for
temporary protection on the grounds that the industry in question would
eventually be able to compete on equal terms with foreign products in
domestic or world markets if it were given temporary protection to enable
it to establish itself. However, as H. Johnson^ points out, this argument
(1) See Harry G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence 
of Domestic Distortions", in H. Johnson Aspects of the Theory of 
Tariffs, George Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp 146-147. The article was 
originally printed in Baldwin et al, Trade, Growth and the Balance of 
Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Chicago: Rand McNally 
Co. 1965) pp 3-34.
jsutified economically by an increase in future income above what it would
otherwise be; and a necessary condition for this is that the infant
industries should eventually be able to compete while paying higher returns
to the factors they employ than those factors would have enjoyed if the infant
industries had not been assisted to maturity by protection.^ Again,
owing to distortions in the economy the private costs of the factors of
production do not reflect their social costs; from the view point of the
infant industry argument it is the latter that matter since that argument
requires that the social rate of return must exceed the private rate of
return. -
Finally criticisms can also be made regarding the implementation
of the above criteria. Although the testing of quality of the protected
domestic products is the special responsibility of the General Directorate
of Industrial Research and Control (within the Ministry of Industry) this
has not been always effective; in many cases firms did not send samples
(2)of their products for testing; and also the requirements of quality
had been relaxed in the end of 1960s0 Moreover, the committee paid little 
considerations to the aspects of monopoly; a firm satisying the above 
criteria was granted protection even though it may have been the only 
producer; a decline in the output of that firm, even though due to factors 
outside its control, will cause serious shortages in the supplies of its 
particular product.
(1) However, Johnson also argues, that it is apparent from the general
principles governing optimal governmental intervention in the presence 
of domestic distortions that the optimal policy entails some sort of 
subsidy to the infant industries rather than protection. See H. Johnson 
ibid . . t>. 146
(2) F. Jaial. o d . cit.. o. 119
Two questions now arise0 First, even though protection in Iraq 
may have been granted merely for the sake of industrial growth we should 
nevertheless examine whether this aim has been achieved. Secondly is 
the structure of protection in Iraq such that growth in protected industries 
could actually lower welfare, i.e. does the theoretical proposition of 
H0G. Johnson have much empirical validity for Iraq. The remainder of the 
thesis is taken up with an empirical analysis of these two questions.
Chapter III discusses different models of protection and resource allocation, 
and in Chapter V we test empirically these models. Chapters VI and VII under­
takes a theoretical and empirical investigation of the welfare implications 
of growth in protected industries.
2.3 Tax Exemptions
In addition to tariffs and quotas the government has granted 
tax exemptions to industrial enterprises. The main features of these 
exemptions, embodied in the 1964 Law of Industrial Promotion^ are 
a) exemptions from income tax on profits of up to 10 per cent of paid up 
capital for five years, b) undistributed profits not exceeding 25 per 
cent of total profits for improvement and expansion are exempted from 
income tax for five years, c) exemptions from import duties on machinery 
and raw materials and d) exemptions from estate tax,. rent on land provided 
by the state and stamp duties. The overall effect of these exemptions is 
to raise the profitabily of domestic firms and this increases the investment 
capacity of these firms and induces expansion. However, in granting these 
exemptions no consideration is given to the private and social costs of 
the industries, nor to whether the costs may be affected by ’learning by 
doing*; nor were the exemptions made conditional to the firms' training 
their labour force. The inference is that the exemptions, like tariffs and 
quotas, were given not on infant industry criteria but simply to promote 
industrialisation per se.
(1) The Law of Industrial Promotion No0 64 of 1964
The above analysis suggests that protection and tax exertions
have usually been granted with little considerations to the infant industry
criteria. Indeed the greater emphasis given to the ability of industries
to satisfy domestic demand (however measured) suggests that industrial
growth and replacement of imports was the more overriding consideration.
Unfortunately from a welfare point of view this may not be beneficial <,
The policies of import substitution in some less developed countries has
tended to protect high cost inefficient industries ^  and thus involve
a welfare loss. Moreover, and this is the important point, growth
in a protected industry may cause a further loss in welfare. H.G0 Johnson
has shown that technical progress in a protected import competing industry
may decrease real income if "the reduction in the cost of currently-
produced import substitutes is more than outweighed by a consequent further
(2)
replacement of imports by high cost domestic substitutes." Thus a
policy of a progressively expanding the size of the import competing 
sector, by granting protection to more and more industries, may substantially 
reduce the prospects of increase in real income0
(1) On the experience of Pakistan, See Soligo and Stern, "Tariff Protection 
Import Substitution and Investment Efficiency", Pakistan Development 
Review, Summer 1965, pp 249-270
(2) See H.G. Johnson, "Tariffs and Economic Development: Some Theoretical 
Issues", in Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs, op, cit<,, p Q 1130 
Reprinted from the Journal of Development Studies, volume 1, No„ 1,
Oct0 1964 pp 3-30. See also H.G0 Johnson, "Tie Possibility of Income 
Losses from Increased Efficiency or Factor Accumulation in the Presence 
of Tariffs”, Economic Journal, March 1967, pp 151-154.
3•1' The Concepts of Nominal and Effective Protection
The standard theory of Protection has been developed within the
framework of perfect competition. Tariffs are assumed to raise the
domestic prices of imports and of their domestic substitutes, and thereby
bring about a change in resource allocation.
Traditional tariff theorists had limited their attention to trade
in final products only as if all stages of fabrication were undertaken '
domestically. More recently, however, the theory of protection has
also taken into account the possibility of trade in raw materials and
intermediate products. The main implication of this is that producer's
decisions are affected by the tariffs on the material inputs as well
as those on the final products. Specifically, whereas tariffs on the
final output provide protection to the producers by enabling a rise in
the domestic prices, tariffs on material inputs reduce the extent of
protection by raising the cost of materials. Thus the modern theory of
protection, known as the concept of Effective Protection, emphasises the
extent of protection to the processing activity in the home country.
Although the main elements of the effective protection concept were
recognised as far back as the 1930s by some tariff making authorities
and are also found in various writings on foreign trade policies,^
a precise statement and systematic analysis of the theory was developed
(2)
in the early 1960s by Corden, Johnson, Balassa, Basevi and others.
The effective rate of protection is defined as the percentage change in 
domestic value added resulting from the tariff structure. It measures 
protection in relation to the value added in the industry rather than 
in relation to the price of the product. Its main message is that in 
order to discover the resource allocation effects of tariffs one must 
calculate the protective rate for each activity. The level of output 
increases (decreases) as the effective rate of protection is positive(negative
^ T h e  notion of effective protection is found in the writings of 
Taussig, Haberler, Meade and Barber. For a historical origin of 
the concept see W.M. Corden, The Theory of Protection, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1971, pp 245-249.
(2)
W.M. Corden, The Tariff, in Alex Hunter (ed), The Economics of 
Australian Industry, Melbourne University Press, 1963
W.M. Corden, The Structure of a tariff system and the Effective Protective 
Rate, Journal of Political Economy, LXXIV (June 1966)', pp 221-237.
II.G. Johnson, The Theory of Tariff Structure With Special Reference 
to World Trade and Development, in H.G. Johnson and P.B. Kennen,
Trade and Development (Geneva 1965).
B. Balassa, Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation, 
Journal of Political Economy, 73, (Dec. 1965) pp 573-594.
G. Basevi, The US Tariff Structure: Estimates of Effective Rates 
of Protection of US Industries and Industrial Labour, RES, 1966, pp 147-15'
^•2 The Theory of Effective Protection - A Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
Effective rate of Protection theory had initially been developed 
within a partial equilibrium framework. The basic formulae of the effective 
rate of protection was derived with the help of the following assumptions
1. The input coefficients for non-primary inputs are fixed for 
each industry
2. the elasticities of. demand for the country’s exports and of 
the supply of its imports are infinite, this is usually 
known as the ’small country' assumption
3* perfect competition prevails in all markets
that all tradables (exports and imports) remain traded after
I
the imposition of tariffs
The first of these assumptions was introduced to rule out the
possibility of substitution between material inputs and primary factors
or between material inputs themselves and renders the effective rates 
(l)estimates biased. The latter three assumptions allow us to state that
domestic prices are determined by world prices and the tariffs. They
(2)
also mile out the possibility of trade reversal.
The effect of the tariff structure on the level of output and 
the measurement cf protection are shown in Figure (3»l). For illustrative 
purposes let the industry purchase yarn which it processes into cloth.
The quantities of cloth and yarn are shown on the horizontal axis and the 
prices on the vertical axis. I^N is the supply curve of imported yarn 
and ©Tw is the c.i.f. import price. Assume that there is no domestic 
production of yarn. VU is the supply curve of value added product; 
under competitive conditions it shows the marginal costs of capital and 
labour used in processing yarn into cloth. The vertical summation of I N  
and VU, shown by ST, gives the supply curve of cloth: by construction 
Olw = VS, and ST is parallel to VU. DD1 is the home demand curve.
(1) The substitution, problem will be considered later on.
(2) W.M. Corden, The Theory of Protection, op. cit,, p. 29
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P V is the perfectly elastic world supply curve of cloth. Under free ■ w
trade it is also the marginal revenue curve facing home producers.
Domestic production is 00^ units, consumption is 0C and thus imports 
are ^ow suPPose that a tariff is imposed only on the imports of
cloth. Let the rate of tariff be such that the price in the domestic 
market rises from 0Pw to OP^. The nominal rate of tariff protection is 
^d^/0Pw ^er cen^* ® le mareP-'nal revenue curve facing home producers 
moves to Pdv/*. Domestic production will expand to the point where the 
marginal cost becomes equal to the domestic price of import: output will 
be OQ^- Suppose next that a tariff is imposed on the material input 
also. Let the rate be I^I^^1^ per unit so that the cos;t of materials 
increases by Idlw per unit; the marginal cost of yarn to home users shifts 
to and thereby shifts the cloth industry's supply curve from ST to
S*T*. The output of cloth will now be reduced to OQ^. The main point 
illustrated is that the new level of output will depend on the tariffs 
on the input as well as on the final product: the greater the tariff 
on imports of final product and the lower the tariff on the material 
input, the greater the likelihood that the tariff structure will increase 
domestic output.
The rate of effective tariff protection can be seen from Figure
(3-1)• Under free trade, value added per unit in the home industry is
given bytOP^ - 01^) ?by construction this equals AQ^. With tariffs on
both cloth and yarn the value added per unit is Pj1^ = The effective
rate is thus /XCQ^ - AQ^)/AQn7 = /TPdPw - IdI'w)/P^Iw . It is clear that
as long as the supply curve of value added is positively sloped an increase
in the value added per unit output due to the tariff structure will induce
an increase in the level of output of cloth. Thus in our example cloth
(l)output increases from 00^ to OQ^. The_welfare loss due to the tariffs
(1) We can also see that if the effective rate is negative the output of 
cloth will be less than under free trade: for example if only the 
material input (yarn) is subject to tariff the effective rate would 
be negative - 3^  I ^ P  I and domestic output of cloth would be below 
the free trad.e level "off.
is composed of two parts: the consumption cost given by the triangle TrEF 
and the production cost given by the triangle GHI.
3.2.1 Measurement of the Effective Fate
The effective rate of protection is defined as the percentage 
increase in the value added per unit made possible by the tariff structure 
Thus
„  v ' - v .
(3.1) zj = -J 1
V .
0
where Z. is the effective rate of protection in industry j 
0
and v^ and v.. are the value added per unit under protection and free trade 
respectively. Taking the input-output system expressed in domestic 
(post tariff) prices the value added is given by
(3.2) V' = x> - E x ' i j S  X' - aij'X'
j i,
where X'. is the value of gross output of industry; j at domestic 
J
market prices, X'ij is the total inputs from industry i to industry j and
a'ij is the input coefficient of good i per unit of output of good j.
Dividing (3-2) through by XI gives the value added per unit of output
J
(3 .3 )  v '  = 1 - C a i j '
i
The free trade value added per unit is estimated by deflating 
domestic flows by the relevant tariff rates:
(3.^) v = t 4 “t ~ ~
i i
where t. is the nominal tariff rate on the final good i and t. 
o . i
is the tariff rate on the input i. v. is the value added per unit when 
both output and inputs are valued at free trade prices. Substituting 
equations (3«3) and (3»A) into (3-1) we get that
1 - *2^ ai j 1 .
Z .   ±— r. . - 1
(3-3) 3 J L . s r a i l l -
1+f. ™  1+t.
O i l
This is the computational formula that has been used in empirical studies
0)by many researchers, In terms of Figure 3*1? the value of the unit .
output at domestic prices is given by P^O whereas the value of inputs
per unit output is equal to the corresponding values at free trade
prices are P O and 10.w w
3.2.2 Negative value added - Interpretations
In the early development of the theory it had been assumed that
input-output coefficients for a particular industry are the same in all
(2)countries. Subsequent research suggested however that this assumption
may be questionable. In fact in sane cases the input-output relationship
in the domestic economy may be so high that the cost of those inputs
valued at world prices may exceed the value of the output also valued
at world prices. The important implication of this is that the domestic
industry would have negative value added at world prices. The possibility
(3)was first revealed in a study by Soligo and Stern of Pakistan's 
industries: they found that about one half of industries examined exhibited 
negative value added at world prices. The most likely explanation for 
this phenomenon, within the partial equilibrium framework, is that an 
infant industry in a developing country such as Pakistan may be less
Wefficient than industry in other countries in its use of material inputs.
(1) For example W.M. Corden, The Tariff, op. cit; G. Basevi, op.cit; 
and B. Balassa, op.cit.
(2) See B. Balassa, Tariff protection in Industrial Countries, op. cit., 
p. 378.
(3) P. Soligo and J. Stern, "Tariff Protection, Import Substitution and 
Investment Efficiency", P.D.R., Summer 1965s PP 2^9-T0
(M-) Moreover, in the supplying country there may be a monopolistic
producer of both the final product and the input who may deliberately 
price exports of the input highly so as to discourage processing 
abroad. See W„M. Corden, The Theory of Protection, op. cit., p.33 •
However, as S. Guisinger^^ points out, a negative value added at world 
prices is not necessarily caused by an unusual degree of inefficiency, 
although it can be, but is most likely to occur where there is over 
production of goods that are uneconomical from the standpoint of opportunity 
cost,
A diagramatic analysis of negative value added at-world prices
(2)
cases has recently been provided by M. Michaely . In Figure 3»2, Pw 
is the world price of a unit of the final product and Iw is the cost at 
world prices of materials used per unit of output in the domestic economy. 
OI^^OP^ indicating that the value added at world prices is negative.
VU is the supply curve of the domestic value added; the vertical addition
)
of this to IwN gives the domestic supply curve ST. Under free trade
domestic production would not take place. A tariff sufficient to raise
the domestic price of the import to, say, OP^ will enable home production
to reach value added measured in domestic prices would be positive
(= P^ This will cause a welfare cost shown by the shaded area
I^XJS. Michaely divides the cost into two elements. First, the foreign
exchange loss which is the amount by which payments for the imported input
exceed the cost of importing the final good; this is shown by XIII
-v w
(i.e. negative value added at world prices). Secondly, the domestic 
resource loss which is the cost of domestic production services involved 
in producing the amount this is shown by I^LJS.
(1) See S. Guisinger, "Negative Value Added and the Theory of Effective 
Protection", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. LXXXIII (Feb. 19^9) 
p. '»32 .
(2) See M. Michaely, "The Welfare Loss of Negative Value Added", Journal 
of International Economics, Vo. 5? 1975* PP 283-287 •
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The possibility of negative value added at world prices raises
a problem in the measurement of the effective rate. The problem is
that in such cases the effective rate, calculated by formula (3«l) is
(v'. - v.)/v., will turn out to be negative; this would be misleading
3 3 3
since the industry is actually protected and could not survive in the
absence of protection.
To avoid this problem of interpretation, Soligo and Stern
suggested that the effective rate be expressed as a proportion of the
value added at domestic prices^^: denoting this formulation by U . we
3
have:
v 1 - v .
(3.6) TJj = ■ -I- v ; J
3
The advantage of this measure is that it will have a positive sign
whenever the effective rate of protection is positive i.e. whenever the
domestic value added (v'.) is greater than the free trade value added (v.)
3 3
Moreover, the measure will be greater than (less than) unity according 
as the value added at free trade prices is negative (positive).
3-2.3 Non Traded Inputs and the Measurement of Effective Protection
The position has so far assumed that all material inputs are 
tradeable and in perfectly elastic supply while the primary factors 
are internationally immobile and available at increasing opportunity cost 
It is likely, however, that some of the material inputs are non~tradeable 
e.g., electricity and services and therefore in less than infinitely 
elastic supply; their prices would be determined by domestic demand and 
supply conditions. The question^therefore,'arises as to how to deal with 
non-traded inputs in the calculation <3f effective rates. The answer
(1) R. Soligo and J. Stern, p. 235 •
depends on the assumption made regarding their supply elasticity to
elastic supply they can he treated just 1 traded material inputs,
i.e. as material inputs with zero tariff* This approach was followed
by Balassa Cl) On the other hand if their supply elasticity is likely
to be less than infinite any change in the demand for their inputs (due
to the tariff structure) will effect their prices. In such cases, Corden
has argued, the effects of tariffs on non-traded inputs are basically the
same as the effect on the primary factors; therefore there is a good reason
for treating them in the same way, i.e. including them as part of the 
(2)value added. The latter method i.e. Corden method, was used for our
( 3 )calculations of the effective rates of protection.
3-3 The Theory of Effective Protection - A General Equilibrium Analysis
The analysis of the effective protection so far has been carried 
out within a partial equilibrium framework where primary factors and
material inputs are combined in fixed (leontief) coefficients.
n . . W  * • • (5)Many writers, e.g., Bhagwati and Srinivasan Ramaswami and Srinivasan,
R. Jones, W.M. Corden, A.H. Tan^^ and others have examined the
(1) See B. Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing 
Countries, published for the IBRD by John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1971? pp ^-5
(2) W.M. Corden, The Theory of Projection, op. cit., pp. 157“63.
(3) Bee chapter IV, section (^.1.2), note (a) of Table 4.1.
(A) J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, " The General Equilibrium Theory 
of Effective Protection and Resource Allocation", Journal of 
International Economics, 1973} vol. 3? pp 239-282 •
(5) V.K. Ramaswami and T.N. Srinivasan, "Tariff Structure and Resource 
Allocation in the Presence of Substitution", in Bhagwati et al Ceds)
Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, North Holland, Amsterdam,1971 *
(6) R. Jones, "Effective Protection and Substitution", J.I.E., 1971? 
vol. 1, pp 59-82 •
(7) W.M. Corden, "The Substitution Problem in the Theory of Effective 
Protection" JIE, 1971? vol. 1, pp 37-57 •
(8) A.H. Tan, "Differential Tariffs, Negative Value Added and the Theory 
of Effective Protection," American Economic Review, LX, 1 (March 1970) 
pp 107-115 *
implications for the theory of allowing substitution between those inputs
within a general equilibrium analysis. The general equilibrium analysis
has shown that the effective protection rates may fail to show the effects
of protection on resource allocation; more over, negative value added
would say little about whether or not an industry would be viable without
protection. The argument has been well illustrated by A.H. Tan whose
analysis is illustrated here.
Suppose that production of, say, the ith good requires only
one material input and one primary (domestic) iactor. Imports of the i ^
good are subject to tariff but the material inputs enter duty free.^^
In Figure 3«3> the vertical axis measures the quantities of the material
thinput in terms of the prices of the i product. The distance OA equals
the material equivalent of a unit of output valued at world prices
while OH shows the material equivalent of a unit of output valued at
domestic prices. The horizontal axis measures quantities of the primary
thfactors. Zi is an isoquant for the i good. The production function is 
assumed to be linear homogeneous. HD is the factor price line. Consider 
a point such as d on the isoquant. In competitive equilibrium, point d 
represents the narginal equivalences between'the unit isoquant and the 
domestic prices of output and inputs. The inpufc-factor combination shown 
at d will yield positive value added in domestic prices since the cost of 
materials used is less than OH. In terms of the world price OA, towever, 
d represents negative value added. The question now is whether the industry 
could survive under free trade. Let us distinguish between two cases.
(l)The other assumptions made are that the country has a differential 
tariff structure in favour of imported inputs, no monopoly power in 
trade, that the economy has adjusted to tfye tariff structure, and the 
exchange rate is fixed. Finally each industry is assumed to be 
in competitive equilibrium with-constant returns to scale, earning 
zero or normal profits. -
OV'At-Vl
(A) The industry concerned is a small economic unit such that the
removal of the tariff on the competing import would not affect domestic
factor prices. The price of the product in terms of the material equivalent
could fall to OA. The unit cost line now becomes AD* (parallel to HD).
This means that the industry would go out of business. (B) The industry
concerned is a large part of the economy such that, the change in the tariff
will affect relative prices of factors and materials. Now if the domestic
factor could become dearere.g., as shown by A F  the industry ftould go out
of existence. On the other hand if the price of the domestic factor
became sufficiently cheaper, e.g., as shown by the price line AC the
industry would not only be viable without protection but would also
expand its output. Thus Tan concludes that in a general equilibrium
setting evidence of negative value added at world prices does not
necessarily mean that the industry would not be viable under free trade;
nor does it. indicate whether the elimination of tariffs would cause
(1) 'resources to shift into or out of the industry.
Effective Protection - A Summing Up .
W e  have seen that the usefulness of the effective protection 
concept as an indicator of resource movements depends on whether the 
analysis is undertaken in a partial equilibrium or general equilibrium 
framework. The general equilibrium framework, though theoretically more ■' 
satisfactory, raises the practical difficulty in that its application 
requires data on substitution elasticities, factor price changes, etc. 
and some of this data may not be available particularly for less developed 
countries. On the other hand, the partial equilibrium analysis though 
theoretically less satisfactory has considerable practical advantages.
(l) A.H. Tan, ibid «
In any case, the partial analysis may be justifiable for a country like 
Iraq since the individual manufacturing industries are rather small in 
relation to the economy as a v/hole and consequently changes in the output 
of any such industries are not likely to affect relative factor prices 
in the economy, I will therefore employ the partial equilibrium analysis 
to examine the effects of protection during 1962 on resource allocation; 
this is done in Chapter V.
3.5 Mark-up Pricing and Protection: An Alternative Model of
Resource Allocation
The previous analysis, framed within the conditions of perfect
competition, assumes that resources are free to enter into the protected
industries. However, as we have seen in Chapter I, competition in Iraqi
industries is severely restricted. In many industries production is
dominated by a few firms. Entry of new firms (as well as the expansion
of existing firms) is restricted by the system of government licensing
of industrial enterprises.^ The prices of manufacturing products
are often determined by government agencies, as well as by the enterprises
largely on the basis of cost plus margin. This type of industrial
environment suggests the need for an alternative analysis of protection
and resource allocation. It is suggested here that, because of the
licensing system, protection does not necessarily induce new firms to
enter the industry and/or an expansion of existing firms. Although the
licensing system does not necessarily prevent the expansion of an
(3)industry it does, however, introduce a regulating factor. The
industry's output may be allowed to expand if protection brings a 
sufficient increase in profits of existing firms. The argument will be 
illustrated with the help of a simple model.
(2)
(1) See Chapter I, Section 1.4 *
(2) In the case of the private sector, prices are determined by the
Permanent Committee for Protection, whereas in the case of the 
public sector prices may be determined by either the Board of 
Directors of the State Company, the Council for the Organisation of 
Trade or by the enterprises themselves. See ibid.
(3) licences are normally granted, among other things, if the licensing
authority was satisfied that there was a sufficient demand for the
in. details, nor has the method been a uniform between the private and
public sector industrial firms, However, the scanty information that is
available seems to indicate that, in general, prices are fixed at a level
(1)to enable firms to earn profit margin over the unit cost of production.
Also that, in fixing the level of domestic prices the administrative bodies
concerned take into account the c.i.f. import prices and aim to keep the
former not very much in excess of the latter.
The pricing policy may be illustrated using a partial
equilibrium model relating to an oligopoly situation. In this we are
particularly concerned with the excess of price over long run average
cost rather than with the interaction aspect of oligopoly.
In Figure 01^ is the unit cost of domestic production;
for simplicity we assume constant costs of production. The firm's
installed capacity enables output equal to 0Q^. The domestic price is
set at a level high enough to enable domestic producers to earn "a
sufficiently high" unit profit; let the price be OP^ ,. DD' is the demand
curve for the product. At the price OP^ domestic demand would exceed
output by In dealing with this problem of excess demand there are
two alternatives that-1 are open to the government: a) it can either ban
imports and allow the price to -rise to a point where demand will be equal
to domestic output or b) it can limit imports to latter
(a)
method which has been used in Iraq practically since 1959- The import 
restriction could in principle be either by a quota or a tariff. If 
it ^ s done by a quota then with the c.i.f. price of imports being OP^
(1) The actual determination of the profit margin may vary between firms;
some take the profit margin as a percentage oj production costs, 
others take it as a percentage of capital invested and sqpn,
See Chapter I, section 1.4.
(2) The system of protection has been considered in Chapter II, Section 2.
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profits, equal to ABGO, will be obtained by the imports licence holders
On the other hand, if imports are restricted by a tariff the government
will collect ABGC in tariff revenues0 However, the actual situation in
Iraq is that imports may be restricted by both quotas and tariffs, in
which case the amount of profits ABGC will be shared by the government
and the importers.
With the domestic price at OP^ ,the price-cost margin per
unit would be P,I, and the total amount of profits on output OQ. would d a  1
be P_AEI_. Protection enables an increase in domestic prices and d d
prifits: in Figure 3.4 protection raises total profits to P^AEI^ from
P CEI . Now the important point is that although protection 
w d
increases profits it will not necessarily induce an expansion in outx>ut 
For output to increase the increase in profits should be considered 
high enough to induce expansion in production capacity0 In other 
words in an oligopoly setting the effect of protection on resource 
allocation is less automatic than the effective protection model0
We thus have presented two models of protection and resource 
allocation:
1) the effective protection model which is rather automatic , 
i0e0 that the responsiveness of resource movements to
the level of protection is automatic and
2) the price-cost margin model which is not automatic i0e0 
that resources do not move automatically in response to 
the level of protection0
(1)
The plan is to undertake a test of these models0 Before we 
do that we need to discuss how to calculate the effective rates of 
protection, the nominal implicit rates of protection from all sources, 
the price-cost margins and resource allocation. This is done in the 
next chapter.
(1)'The various models, discussed above, will be used to explain the 
growth in import substitution in Chapter V,
^ O ’A vht»t:»,d  ttt
MEASURES OF PROTECTION AND RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION IN IRAQ * S INDUSTRY
Before testing our alternative theories of resource allocation 
with respect to Iraq’s manufacturing industries we need to estimate 
the measures of protection, price-cost margins and resource allocation.
4.1 EFFECTIVE RATES OF TARIFF PROTECTION
4.1.1 The Assumptions and Computational Formula
Estimation of the effective rates is made practicable by 
relying on five simplifying assumptions: 1) fixed coefficients between
materials and other factor inputs, 2) the elasticities of export demand 
and import supply are infinite, 3) protection does not eliminate trade 
in any of the products so that the domestic price of competing imports 
would be given by the c.i.f. price plus the tariff, 4} domestically 
produced goods and their competing imports are homogenous and 5) the 
official exchange rate is an equilibrium rate.
The effective protection measure, denoted by U^ , is
computed by the formula:
v * — v
(4.1) U. = _j_____
3 v.'
J
where v_l and v are the value added per unit output at domestic and
free trade prices respectively. This measure, which was first used by
Soligo and Stern,^ is the percentage increase in domestic value added
due to tariff protection. The advantage of this measure, as was
pointed out in Chapter III, is that it will have a positive sign whenever
the value added at domestic prices exceeds that at free trade prices
2even though the latter may be negative) . For the estimation of the unit 
value added we define our units in such a way that the value of output
(1) R. Soligo and J. Stem, op. cit., p. 255.
(2) This measure will have a negative sign only in genuine cases of
negative effective protection, i.e., when v*. is less than v. and
3 j
both are positive.
is equal to unity. Thus the value added per unit output will be 
given by:
(4.2) v! = 1 -^Laij'
3 K
Next if the difference between domestic and import price is due only 
to the tariff, the value added at free trade prices can be estimated 
by deflating the value of the domestic flows.
<4-3> ^  ir-j 1 + t . a 1 + t.
3 i
Where t_. and t_^ are the nominal tariff rates on output and inputs 
respectively. Substituting (4.3) and (4.4) into (4.1) gives our 
computational formula:
  / 1 _ ai j1 \
(4.4) u. = 1 ~ r ljl "I1 + S  1 1  + h  /
i - 2 aij'
i
4*1*2 Estimates of the Effective Rates
The input-output coefficients aij' were calculated from the
data in The Monthly Industrial Census for 1962, for large scale
manufacturing. This source gives output sales (i.e. the values include
excise taxes on output) ^ . The year 1962 was chosen because there
were major changes in tariff rates in that year and it is hoped to see
the effects of these on resource allocation in later years. The
nominal tariff rates were derived from the Customs Tariff Law 1955 and
its amendments up to 1962 (the year for which our protection measures
relate). In cases where an industry consists of a number of products
the industry tariff was obtained as a simple average of the rates on
the individual products. The data enables us to estimate U. for 26
3
industries; these industries accounted for about 50 per cent of total
manufacturing output in 1962. The rates are shown in Table 4.1.
(1) Only few manufacturing products in Iraq are subject to excise taxes 
on output. In 1962, taxes were confined to Cigarettes, Matches, 
Vegetable Oils and Soaps, Cement and Oil products. When output 
is reported at market prices (i.e. including excise taxes on output) 
its value at world prices is estimated by deflating by (1 + t) , 
whereas if output is reported at factor cost it should be deflated
by (l+t—d) where d is the excise tax rate. See Lewis and Guisincrer, 
•>*> I 1 *7^  /^■V* & ftCjlu* 9 S r * - — t ^  ^ *
- 37 - 
TABLE 4.1
RATES OF PROTECTION IN IRAQ, 
SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1962
NO. Industry t.
3
u.
3
Consumer Goods (0.72) (0.83)
0.97 0.84
1 Dairy products 0.83 1.25
2 Grain milling 0.40 2.90
3 Macaroni 0.87 0.81
4 Biscuits &
Confectionary 2.12 1.37
5 Sugar 0.77 0.71
6 Vegetable oils 0.90 1.19
7 Soft drinks 1.00 0.54
8 Cigarettes 5.23 1.03
9 Cotton textiles 0.21 0.24
lo Woolen textiles 0.42 0.45
11 Silk textiles 0.53 0.61
12 Vests & Socks 0.43 0.38
13 Knitting 0.32 0.57
14 Footwear 0.76 0.65
15 Carpentry 0.45 0.48
16 Cosmetics 0.75 0.73
17 Soaps 0.70 0.71
18 Matches 0.84 0.55
Intermediate Goods 0.2 6 0.61
19 Jute & ropes 0.23 0.26
20 Wool pressing 0.21 0.86
21 Tanning 0.40 0.60
22 Paper & products 0.20 0.73
Investment Goods 0.1*f 0.12
23 Cement 0.18 0.16
24 Tiles 0.07 0.02
25 Gypsum (Lime) 0.11 0.04
26 Glass & products 0.20 0.24
Overall average 0.74 0.70
(0.56) (0.69)
Notes; a) Calculation of the effective rates has been
made by the use of the 'Corden' method.
b) The figures in brackets exclude the cigarettes
industry from the average of Consumer Goods 
and from the overall average.
c) t . and U . are the nominal and the effective
3 D
tariff rates in industry j respectively.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between nominal
and effective rates of tariff protection is 0.63, which though signficant
at the one per cent level is low enough to indicate that the ranking of
effective rates for particular industries differ from those given by
the nominal rates. The average of the effective rates for all industries
(except cigarettes) was 69 per cent. This is not very high compared
with rates prevailing in other underdeveloped countries in Asia and
Latin America, e.g., the average effective rates for some 15 comparable
manufacturing industries in Pakistan in 1963 was 123 per cent.^ The
overall average hides considerable variability in the rates for different
(2)industries. In general, consumer goods are more heavily protected
than intermediate goods and the latter, in turn, receive more
protection than investment goods. The average rates for these groups
are 83 per cent, 61 per cent and 12 per cent respectively.
Interestingly, this broad pattern of protection corresponds to that
indicated by the nominal tariff rates. Moreover, this pattern is also
(3)
in line with the evidence for some other less developed countries.
In five industries the effective rate is greater than unity, 
implying negative value added at world prices; in other words the net 
subsidy received by industries, through tariffs and taxes, exceeds 
the value added. This result could be due to inefficient use of material 
inputs (a possibility that has previously been suggested by Soligo and 
Stern in their study of Pakistan industries). However, an alternative 
explanation to the negative value added at world prices is the existence
(1) The average rate for Pakistan was derived from Soligo and Stern, 
op. cit., table 1, pp 258-59.
(2) Within the consumer good industries the food industries are the 
most heavily protected whereas textiles are the least protected 
industries. See Table 4.1.
(3) See B. Balassa, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries, 
op. cit.
of the price controls which tend to prevent the prices of domestic 
products from rising by the full amount of the tariff* In this case 
the nominal rates used to calculate the effective rates may not 
correctly indicate the difference between the domestic and the estimated 
(derived) world prices. ^  The above result may also be due to the 
quality differences between domestic products and competing imports; 
the former, in some cases, are inferior to the latter. These 
possibilities suggest that a more complete measure of protection would 
require a direct comparison of the c.i.f. prices of imports and the 
domestic prices of competing products. Each such comparison would 
give the nominal implicit rate of protection. Ideally the price comparison 
should be carried out for the final products as well as their inputs. 
Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of data on several of the 
inputs it was not possible to calculate the effective implicit rates 
of protection. Thus we are restricted to nominal implicit rates.
4.2 Nominal Implicit Rates of Protection
Denoting the rate for the j'th commodity by t_. we have:
(4.5) t. = (Pdj - Pf .)/Pfj
where P^ is the domestic price of commodity j and Pf. is the c.i.f.
(2)
import price of commodity j. I have been able to estimate the
(1) This result may also be due to the fact that in certain cases 
e.g., Cigarettes, Matches, etc., the tariff is designed mainly for 
revenue purposes rather than to enable an increase in the domestic 
produce price.
(2) The world price, here, is the actual price of imports as opposed
to the estimated world price values used in the calculation of
the effective tariff rates (by deflating flows in domestic prices 
by the relevant tariffs).
/ j)
nominal implicit: rates tor 15 industries for the years 1966 and 1969.
The prices for domestic products are unit values calculated from data in
the Industrial Census; for multiyproductindustries the price is an
average of the unit values of the major commodities. Import prices
are unit values obtained from data in the Foreign Trade Statistics.
The implicit rates are shown in Table 4.2. It is seen that, for 1966
there is a wide inter-industry variation in the rates. Six of the fifteen
industries have negative rates, i.e. the price of the domestic substitute
is less than that of the competing import. This result gives some
support to the suggestion made earlier that in some industries the prices
of domestic products are controlled by administrative decree and are
not allowed to rise to the level implied by the extent of protection.
In concluding, it is appropriate to anticipate some likely
criticisms of our effective rate estimates. First, it had been assumed
that there was no substitution between material inputs and the primary
factors. To the extent that substitution does obtain, our estimates
assumed to be
would be overstated. Second, the exchange rate wa/in equilibrium*
however, protection and foreign exchange controls may have caused the 
domestic currency to be overvalued and this, in turn would make our 
effective rates estimates to be overstated. Thus the presence of . ' ' -
substitution and/or overvaluation of the domestic currency will make our 
estimates subject to errors. However., the errors relating to the rates 
of individual industries need not result in a systematic bias in our 
estimates if they affect all industries by the same extent, i.e., 
if the ranking of industries are not affected by substitution and 
overvaluation then this does not constitute a problem in our case.
(1) It would have been interesting to estimate the nominal implicit rates 
of protection for 1962 for this would enable us to compare them
with the nominal explicit rates (i.e. tariffs) for that year; 
unfortunately, this was not possible due to the unavailability of 
data for 1962.
(2) A case study on Taiwan has shown that the magnitudes of the effective 
rates of industries are reduced by the presence of substitution 
between material inputs and primary factors. See J.C. Leith,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol, 82, 1968, pp. 588-601.
TABLE (4.2)
Nominal Implicit Rates of Protection for 
Selected Industries, 1966- and 19^9
No. INDUSTRY t %  %  %
1966 1969
1 Sugar refining 128 138
2 Canning 123 117
3 Woollen textiles 94 146
4 Dairy products 83 55
5 Beer 35 33
6 Paper and products 30 6
7 TV and Radio 24 132
8 Veg. oils and Soajb 14 21
9 Cotton Textiles 1 -13
10 Domestic Utensils -26 -47
11 Cigarettes -28. -45
12 Asbestos -32 -38
13 Macaroni -38 -54
14 Footwear -57 -42
15 Cement -58 -50
^ P PNote: t = d - f , the nominal implicit rate of protection
pf
Source: Compiled from Appendix table (A.4.1.)
In fact, the overvaluation of the domestic currency does not change
the ranking of industries rates of protection if the Cordon measure
(1)of effective protection is used.
k . 3  The Price-Cost Margins for Iraq's Industry
The price cost margin is a measure of profitability of an 
industry. For an industry producing only one product the margin is
(4.6) = (P. - c.)/P.
where Ts, = the price-cost margin in industry j
P . =s the price of the product of industry j and
3
c . sr the cost of production per unit output of
3
industry j.
In reality, however, most industries produce a number of (similar) products. 
Correspondingly the available data shows gross sales and total costs of 
production. Empirical estimates of the margin are therefore usually 
obtained as
(4.7) fr- = ( 1  - O . A .3 3 3 3
where X. is total sales of industry j and C. is the total cost of 
3 3
production of industry j. Ideally the costs should include those of 
materials, labour and capital; but once again there is a data unavailability 
constraint, i.e. reliable data on the capital costs are not obtainable - 
thus our measure of costs will include only those of materials and labour. 
The margin will be estimated as:
fk Xn “ ( S Mi3 '* * 0(4.8; jr =.. _.3_.4 \ * v
where Mij is the cost of material i used in production of good j, w.
3
is the wage cost in industry j. and the two terms in brackets represent
the total cost of production.
The estimates of the price-cost margins for 1? manufacturing
(l) The Corden measure of effective protection (which we have used) makes
rankings insensitive to the change in the value of the exchange rate.
The Balassa measure, on the other hand, may affect the rankings of
industries since it regards the value added component of non-traded
goods as an input whose value does not vary with the exchange rate.
See B. Balassa, op. eit*, p. 325; see also S. Lewis and S . Guisinger, 
rvnr off - , * o 11*86..
TABLE k.J
Price-Cost Margins for Selected Industries, 1962 
(percentages)
NO. INDUSTRY
1 Dairy products 17.*f
2 Macaroni 13.6
3 Sugar manufacturing 17-3 .
h Ve. Oils & Soaps l*f.*f
5 Cotton Textiles 30.0
6 Woollen Textiles 30.2
7 Rayon Textiles 13.3
8 Vest and Socks 2 8 A
9 Jute Textiles 51.^
10 Knitted Clothing 2.6
11 Footwear 22.9
12 Carpentry 13.^
13 Paper and products 13.0
1*f •Tanning 21.1
15 Cosmetics 3^.9
16 Cement 5606
17 Cotton ginning 9.1
Sources: Compiled from Appendix table (A..^ .2.)
industries, for 1962, are shown in Table 4.3. There is a wide range 
of variations as between inter-industries: the minimum and the maximum 
are 2.6 per cent and 56.6 per cent respectively; the average for all 
the industries is 23 per cent. Since the purpose of estimating the 
margins is to use them as an alternative to the rates of protection, 
in explaining industrial growth, it seems worth checking whether these 
measures are related. A regression equation showed no significant
relationship between the margins and the effective rates of tariffs for 1962
7T . (62) = 48.47 - 0.1935 U.(62) R2 = 0.209
*' 3 3
(0.11^0) T 1.629
This lack of relationship may perhaps be due to the possibility that,
although tariffs may increase the margins, the tariff rates may have been 
selected at levels to protect inefficient industries, and so the high tariffs
are for industries with low margins. Therefore we may safely use these two
variables as alternative influences to explain industrial growth.
4.4 IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, AS A MEASURE OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION.
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
4.4.1 Method of Estimation
The initial problem is to decide how to measure the resource
shifts. Simpler methods would be to examine the absolute change in
output, or the proportional change in output over the period concerned
(i.e. &  X/X) . However, since we are interested mainly in the effect
of protection and since protection is supposed to have opposite effects
on domestic output and imports it would be better to use a measure
that takes these into account. This suggests that we use a coefficient
of import substitution, i.e. a measure that indicates the extent to
which the change in domestic production is due to the replacement of
imports.
The measure of import substitution, first introduced by 
H. Chennery in his study of the patterns of industrial growth,^ has
(1) H.B. Chennery, "Patterns of Industrial Growth", American Economic 
Review, Sep. I960, pp 624-54.
since been widely used in empirical studies. ~ He attributes the growth
in domestic output to i) the growth in demand and ii) to an increase
in the ratio of domestic output to total supply; the latter is due
to the replacement of imports and is therefore called import substitution.
(2)This measure has since been adapted by Lewis and Soligo and P. Desai.
We start with the basic identity
(4.11)) Z H  X + M ~ R  + D + E
where Z is total supply (which is equal to domestic output plus imports),
X is domestic production, M is imports, R is intermediate demand,
D is the final domestic demand and E is exports. Now define the domestic 
share of total supply as U = X/Z , so that X = U.Z
Then taking the total differential we have
(4.12) dX = U.dZ + dU . Z
This shows that if U remains fixed, i.e. dU =0, imports account
for a constant proportion of domestic supply and changes in domestic
output would be given by U.dZ. On the other hand domestic supply
may be constant but changes in output could arise from import substitution,
i.e. dz •= 0 but dU ^ 0. For purposes of empirical estimation
equation (4.12) is written in terns of incremental values:
(4.13) & x  = ux (z2 - Zj) + Ctr2 - U ) z2
where the subscripts 1 and 2 represent the time period of the base 
and target years. The import substitution effect is given by the 
expression (U2 ~ Z2 . Expressing this as a proportion of the total 
change in output - to facilitate inter industry comparison of the 
relative contribution of each industry to the change in output of that 
industry - gives our computational formula:
(1) Among those studies employing the Chennery measure are: S,R. Lewis 
and R. Soligo, "Growth and Structural Change in Pakistan's 
Manufacturing Industry, 1954-1964", Pakistan Development Review,
Spring 1965, pp 94-139? M.D. Steuer. and C.V. Voivodes, "Import 
Substitution and Chennery Patterns of Industrial Growth: A 
Further Study", Economia Internationale, Feb. 1965, pp 46-77?
P. Desai, "Alternative Measures of Import Substitution", Oxford 
Economic Papers, Nov. 1969, pp 312-323.
(2) See Lewis and Soligo, op, cit. and P. Desai, op. cit.
(u.0 - u.,) z /(X. /Z ) - (X /Z.,)7
•)2 ']! 3 2 t2 t2 j 1 n 1-7! l/!t o = ,3A 3.-L..J:
1 j ~  ' 3
j 1 21 ^ Q — . .. r- ^ _  -^--  ^  .  ^— r,
U  '■ J ” ~  h  X j2
where S . is the import substitution coefficient in industry j and ^  X_.
is the change in domestic output^ (i.e. X^ - X^) .
There have, recently, been some theoretical refinements
to the Chennery measure of import substitution. S. Morley and 
(2)G. Smith argued for incorporating the indirect (as well as the direct)
changes in demands for imports? they suggested that this would give
relatively higher values of import substitution than those got by
the Chennery measure. However, this refinement does not seem
particularly important in our case, since the alleged downward bias
of the Chennery measure occurs mainly in the intermediate good
(3)
industries, which are rather unimportant in our study. Moreover, 
this refinement would not even be practicable since it would require 
the use of detailed Input-Output tables and such data is not available 
for Iraq.
4*4.2 Data and Estimates
The basic data used for the computations are domestic 
output (measured at factor cost) and competing imports valued at 
c.i.f. prices. The data and their sources are found in Appendix 
tables (A.4.4), (A.4.5) and (A.4.6). All data re expressed in current 
prices, since suitable price deflators are unfortunately not readily 
obtainable. The data enables estimation of import substitution for 25
til A statistical problem connected with this formula when we want to 
use it for aggregating import substitution (I.S.) for major 
industry groups. One procedure that was followed by Lewis and 
►Soligo is to compute I.S. for each industry, aggregating these 
for the group as a whole and dividing the total by the growth 
of output for the group. The other procedure is to work directly 
with the (aggregated) totals of imports, supplies and domestic 
production for the group as a whole. The choice between the two 
methods, however, is arbitrary. See. P. Desai, op. cit., pp. 320-21.
(2) See S.A. Morley and G. Smith, "On the Measurement of Import Substitution", 
Economic Journal, 1970, pp 728-35.
(3) In their study on the Brazilian industries, Morley and Smith found 
that about 87 per cent of the differences between the estimates
of their measure and those of Chennery*s in manufacturing industries
were accounted for by seven intermediate good industries. See ibid., 
n, 7 37.
TAbLh; 4.4
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN IRAQ’S INDUSTRY 
1960-1966, 1966-71 and 1960-71
NO. INDUSTRY 1960-66 1966-71 1960-71
1
Consumer’s Goods 
Dairy products 0.439 0.429 0.576
2 Canning 1.000 0.946 1.000
3 Veg. oils and Soaps 0.716 -0.003 0.358
4 Sugar manufacturing 1.182 -0.128 0.765
5 Alcoholic beverages -0,040 0.057 -0.012
6 Cigarettes -0.115 0.144 0.137
7 Cotton textiles 0.179 0.605 0.454
8 Woollen textiles 0.852 0.500 0.733
9 Rayon textiles 0.175 0.847 0.816
10 Knitted clothing 0.188 1.252 0.669
11 Footwear 0.545 0.012 0.242
12 Wood and furniture 0.501 0.347 0.512
13 Cosmetics 1.053 -2.285 -0.377
14 TV and Radio 1.000 0.969 1.000
15
Intermediate Goods 
Jute 1.476 0.115 0.890
16 Paper and products 0.541 0.542 0.603
17 Pharmaceuticals 0.303 0.152 0.915
18 Paints 1.000 0.509 1.000
19 Fertilizers 0.000 1.000 1.000
20
Investment Goods 
Glass and products 1.000 0.882 1.000
21 Cement 0.007 0.005 0.007
22' Tiles -0.215 0.025 -0.183
23 Machinery 0.000 1.000 1.000
24 Tractors and ag. 0.000 1.000 1.000
25 Asbestos 0.024 0.176 0.151
Source: Appendix tables (A.4.7), (A.4.8) and (A.4.9)
manufacturing industries for 1960-71 as well as for the sub-periods 
1960—66 and 1966—71. The estimates are. snown m  Table 4.4. Pve see, 
from this table, that some industies namely, Alcoholic beverages, 
Cigarettes, Cement, Tiles and Asbestos^ have a very low coefficient 
of import substitution in both of the sub-periods; this is due to the 
fact that these industries were already, by 1960, satisfying almost 
the whole of the domestic market. In contrast, in those cases where 
the industries came into existence only at the start of the period 
covered the whole of the increase in ourput was substitution for 
imports and the import substitution coefficients reached unity.
In yet some other industries the coefficients were negative, implying 
that the competing imports grew faster than domestic output.- In 
general, however, there does not seem to be any broad patterns in 
the nature of import substitution: for example we cannot say that 
import substitution has been greater in the consumer goods industries 
than in intermediate goods or investment goods industries. This is 
interesting because, earlier, i.e. in Table 4.1 we had found such 
patterns for the effective protection rates. Thus at first glance the 
pattern of industrial growth does not seem to be related to the structure 
of protection. This question is investigated further in the next 
chapter.
CHAPTER V 
PROTECTION AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
5.1 INTRODUCTION:
We have seen in Chapter II, that the commercial policy in 
Iraq since the 1950s, and in particular from 1958, was directed to 
promoting the country's industrialisation through import substitution.
The instruments that have been used were moderately high and differentiated 
customs tariffs, quantitative import restrictions, special financial 
benefits e.g., tax exemptions and provision of credits and, the direct 
role of the government in initiating public sector industries.
In this chapter we investigate the effect of protection on 
industrialisation i.e., import substitution. The procedure will be to .'
make use of regression analysis. The explanatory variables will be the 
various measures of protection that were discussed in Chapters III and IV. 
Following that I test an alternative model which attempts to explain 
growth in terras'-of the industry's price-cost margins.
5.2 TESTING THE PREDICTION OF TARIFFS - NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE
The theory of nominal tariff postulates that tariffs affect 
resource allocation and hence import substitution through changes!in 
relative prices of products, while the theory of effective tariffs 
suggests that resources are pulled towards sectors having higher effective 
rates. The explanatory variables explaining import substitution could be 
either nominal tariffs, effective tariffs or the nominal implicit rates 
of protection from all sources. To begin with I will use the nominal 
and the effective tariff rates for 1962 to examine the growth of import 
substitution during I96O-I966, of twelve manufacturing industries.
For the later periods, e.g., 1966 and 1969 quantitative restrictions on 
imports became relatively more effective instruments of protection.
(l) A detailed account of these industrial policies was given in Chapter II-
The overall effect of protection in this period may be captured by obtaining 
direct comparisons of domestic and 'world* prices for the output and 
inputs. I decided to use the relative prices of final output to obtain 
a more complete picture of nominal protection. The nominal implicit 
rates of protection were discussed in Chapter IV. There is - a genuine 
problem here as to the time period during which import substitution 
responds to the changes in tariffs. My judgement, however, is that a 
period of five years may be adequate for the adjustment in domestic output 
to take place following a change in the tariff structure or the price 
relatives.
The following variables are used in linear and log linear
form in the regression analysis ’
Dependent Variables
S.(60-66) = import substitution in industry j during the 
0
(2)
(I96O-I966) period. S . was defined in Chapter IV.
J
S.(66-71) = import substitution in industry j during 
J
(1966-71).
Independent Variables
t.(62) = the nominal rate of tariff for industry j in 1962.
U_. (62) = the effective tariff rate for industry j in 1962.
t..(66) = nominal implicit rate of .-protection for industry j
in 1966, which is defined as (P^/P^) - 1, where is the
ratio of domestic to import prices.
t .(69) =5 the corresponding nominal implicit rate of protection
3
for industry j in 1969*
The data are in Appendix Tables (A«5«l) and (A.9.2).
(1) In his study on industrial growth in Pakistan, S. Lev/is has taken a 
period of five years for import substitution in his regression analysis, 
See S. Lev/is, Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan,
George Allen and Unwin, 1969.
(2) (X2/Z2) - (x V z b  .2
55 _ __jL.----------------- \
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where (X/Z) is the ratio of domestic output to domestic supply; 
w. X is the change in domestic output, and the superscripts are for
The results are reported'.in Tables (5-1) and (5*2). Table (5*1) 
shows that the structure of tariffs in 19o2 does not appear to have been 
statistically significant in explaining inter-industry import substitution 
during I96O-I966. Neither the coefficients of the nominal nor those of 
the effective tariff rates were found to be significant; and this was 
true of both the linear and the logarithmic forms of the equations.
As for the performance of the nominal implicit rates of protection 
the results, given in table (5*2), suggest that these rates do not seem 
to explain import substitution. The rates for both 1966 and 19&9 were 
not significantly related to import substitution during 1966-71 at any
reasonable level of significance. The fit was very poor; as seen in
2 1 (R ) as they did not exceed 0.101.
The poor performance of both nominal and effective tariff rates
as well as the nominal implicit rates of protection in explaining industrial
growth may be due to a number of factors. First, whereas some of our
measures of protection made use of tariff rates only Iraq's industry
enjoyed protection from quantitative restrictions as well.^^ To that
extent nominal and effective tariff rates will not be complete measures
of protection. Our implicit nominal rates take!into^account the effect
of quantitative restrictions onuoiitput only. Ideally, our measures should
allow for the effects of quantitative restrictions on inputs as well as
output. The estimation of the 'world prices' of inputs would have been
(2)extremely difficult due to reasons of data collection. .Thus this latter 
measure is rather incomplete too.
(1) Quantitative restrictions on imports (quotas and prohibitions)
began to be used since 1959 and the coverage of these retrictions
increased steadily over time. See Chapter II, section 2.2
(2) The units of measurements as well as the classifications of the trade
statistics and those' of the manufacturing census may not always be
comparable. In addition some of the inputs are supplied domestically 
and as such do not have a 'world price'.
TABLE 5.1
REGRESSION EQUATIONS RELATING IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN
IRAQ'S INDUSTRY TO PROTECTION
(60-66) = 52.258 + 0.2522t. (62) R2 = 0.022
( o . ^ n ) 3
/
S. (60-66) = 2.689 + 0.331^ log t^(62) . R2 = 0.061
(0.8075)
2.A S. (60-66) = 75.665 - 0.161 U_.(62) R2 = 0.011
(0.3^25)
2.B log S. (60-66) = 3.^9 + 0.127 log U. (62) R2 = 0.006
3 (0.2567) 3
l.A S.
3
l.B log
Notes;
The t-test values of the regression coefficients are given in 
parentheses.
The number of observations (n) is equal to 12.
Sj (60-66) = import substitution in industry j during 1960-66.
t. (62) and U.(62) = the nominal and the effective rates of tariff 
 ^ in industry j for 1962 respectively.
TABLE 5.2
REGRESSION EQUATIONS RELATING IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN
IRAQ'S INDUSTRY TO THE NOMINAL IMPLICIT RATES OF PROTECTION
l.A= S. (66-71) = 
J
36.35 + 0.1287 Pd./Pf • (66)3 ■ j
(0.6029)
R2 = 0.043
1.B log S. (66-71) 
3
= 2.31 + 0.1739 log Pd ./Pf. (66)I I
(0.5174)
R2 = 0.032
2.A S . (66-71) = 
3
32.66 + 0.1712 Pdj/P fj (69) 
(0.9819)
R2 = 0.107
2.B log S. (66-71) 
3
= 2.38 + 0.1466 log Pd ./Pfj (69) 
(0.4655)
R2 = 0.026
Notes:
The t-test values are.:in parentheses 
The number of observations, (n) equals 10.
Sj (66-71) = import substitution in industry j during 1966-71.
/Pf (66) and P^ /P^ (69) = the nominal implicit rates of
 ^ protection for industry j in 1966 and
1969 respectively
Secondly, as Bhagwati has pointed out in the Indian context,
that investment licensing may prevent resources from moving to industries
with high protection^. Ideally if the relevant data were available
the effect of licensing could have been investigated by incorporating a dummy 
variable in the regression model.. Unfortunately such kind of data is not available: 
licences are given to particular 1 firms1 while protection is granted to the 
whole 'industry'. Thirdly, it has been argued that protection may, in 
some cases, reduce efficiency and in turn the level of output: the rise
in the tariff may lead to a decrease in the input of the managerial factor
measured in efficiency units and this may more than offset the inflow of
(2)
factors from other industries. An alternative explanation for the lack
of correspondence between the level of protection and that of output is
that some industries may-have been so inefficient that if it had not been
for protection they might have lost their primary factors to other industries•
Thus, instead of attracting primary factors into these industries
protection may have just helped to keep the existing factors in production
in those industries. Moreover, the expansion in the domestic output
has been held back by the shortage of imported materials (caused by the
administrative controls, and import licensing).
Finally, a point related to these kinds of tests has been made by
S. Guisinger that whereas protection rates used in the regression test
related to one point in time it may be that the change in the level
of protection over a given period might be a better predictor of changes 
(3)in output. However, the important point is that there is a time lag 
between a change in the tariff and the reaction to this change by industries 
and also the length of time over which the adjustment to this change takes 
place. It is difficult to know precisely the time lag involved and the 
length of the time period for the adjustment process.
(1) See J. Bhagwati and P. Desai, India: planning for industrialisation,
Oxford University Press, p. 341.
(2) W.M. Corden, "The Efficiency Effects of Protection", in I.A. McDougall 
and R.H. Snape (eds), Studies in International Economics, Monasn .
Conference Papers, North Holland, 1970, pp. I-1G.
(3) S. Guisinger, "The Characteristics of Protected Industries in Pakistan", 
in H. Grubel and H. Johnson (eds), Effective Tariff Protection,
It is interesting to note that in the case of Pakistan, 5. Lewis
investigated, by multiple regression analysis, the relationship between
the ratio of output to total supply (X/Z) and both the effective tariff
rates and the value of imported inputs per unit of cubput (2 L mij/X.).
*- 0
He found that only the latter variable to be signficantly related to
import substitution, with a negative coefficient thus he concluded that
the relative availability of domestic raw materials and semi-processed
materials rather than the effective tariff was the critical factor
determining resource allocation. Testing the above model for Iraq
we have found that‘'the availability of domestic materials was not an
important factor in resource allocation; this latter variable gave
(2)insignficant but positive coefficient.
5.3 PRICE-COST MARGINS AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL EXPLAINING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
In Chapter III I had suggested that an analysis of protection
based on the assumptions of a perfectly comeptitive market may not be
(3)very appropriate for the Iraqi economy. The market structure in that 
country, the administrative system of pricing and governmental controls 
over the economy suggest that a model of protection which explicitly 
recognises the existence of a price-cost margin may be more appropriate.
In this section we examine whether such a model can help explain resource 
allocation more satisfactorily. • .
(1) See S. Lewis, op. cit.
(2) Our regression equation gave the following results:
S . (60-66) =. 70.33 - . l W k U  + .l637Emij/X. R2 = .016
(.3039) (.8016) F = . 07^
The performance of this equation is very poor in every aspect.'
(3) See Chapter III, section 3»5 and Chapter I, section 1.4.
The hypothesis being tested postulates that it is the price-
ost margin that influences the investment capacity of f:
affects industrial growth. The price-cost margin being used, as defined
in Chapter XV, is the private price-cost margin where the cost elements 
are the money values of labour and material inputs. The model seeks 
to explain inter-industry import substitution for (1960*66) by the price- 
cost margins for 1962. Both linear and logarithmic forms of equations 
have been tried. The results are shown in Table 5-3»
The T-test values are in parentheses 
*The T-test is significant at the 5 per cent level 
**The T-test.is significant at the 10 per cent level.
(n) the number of observations is 12.
The above table suggests that there is a significant relationship
between industrial import substitution and the price-cost margins for the 
1960-66 period. The regression coefficient in the linear form, is 
significantly different from zero at the 3 per cent level. The logarithmic 
equation does not perform as well as that of the linear; its regression 
coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level. Therefore the price- 
cost margins seem to offer a more satisfactory explanation of import 
substitution for the 1960-66 period.
TABLE 5-3
REGRESSION EQUATIONS RELATING IMPORT 
SUBSTITUTION TO PRICE-COST MARGINS
S.(60-66) = 18.127 + 2.173 T^(62)
(2.193)
R2 = O.A59
log S (60-66) = 2.3^7 + O.56O log?V(62)
(2.18*0
R'2 = 0.323
Notes:
5„*f TESTING THE PRICE-COST MARGINS AND PROTECTION MEASURES COMBINED
It is interesting to find out as to whether the price-cost
margins and 'protection combined can explai^ import substitution better
than do the price-cost margins on their own.^' For this purpose multiple
regression models, relating import substitution to price-cost margins and
some measures of protection, were tested for two periods. The first 
equations
set 1A-1B) relates import substitution during 1960-66 to price-
cost margins and the effective tariffs for 1962. The second set 
equations
(/;s 2A and 2B), on the other hand, relate import substitution during 
1966-71 to price-cost margins and the nominal implicit rates of protection
for 1969- Both models were tested in linear and logarithmic fonqs.
}
The data are found in appendix table (A.5.2).
The results are reported in Table These show that, for
import substitution during 1960-66, while the price-cost margins were
significant as in the simple regression equations, the effective tariffs
(2)
remained insignificant. The explanatory power of the model reflected by
2 '
(R ) has slightly improved - but this improvement was found to be not
(3)statistically significant. Turning to the import substitution during 
the 1966-71 period the results of the above table show that the price- 
cost margins of 1969 and the nominal implicit rates of protection for 
the same year do not ^ offer a satisfactory explanation of import 
substitution. Neither the coefficients of the price-cost margins nor 
those of the implicit rates were found to be significant even at the 10$ 
level. The coefficients of determination ranged between 0.291 and 0.389j 
which are not significant at the 3°/° level. This poor performance was common 
to the linear and logarithmic forms of the equations.
(3.) Empirical testing has indicated that there was no significant re3.ation-
ship between price-cost margins and protection. See Chapter IV, 
section (*f.3)«
(2) For the effect of the effective tariff variable alone on import substitution
see Table 5.1, equations 2.A and 2.B.
(3) For this an analysis of variance test was carried out. See, for this
test, A. Koutsoyiannis, Theory of Econometrics, pp 152-156.
TABLE 5.b
REGRESSION EQUATIONS RELATING IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
TO PRICE-COST MARGINS AND PROTECTION
S.(66-66) = -13.25 + 2.53^1^(62) + 0.371 U-C62) 
(3.018) *  (1.000)
log S.(60-66) = .016 +.671 logl^\(62) + .^ 96 log U.(62)
J J 3
(2.497)* (1.175)
S.(66-71) = 113.67 - 2.309"^.(69) - .029 Pd./Pf.(69)
J 3 3 3(1.789) (.156)
log S.(66-71) = 14.82 - 3-472 logTC(69) - .121 log Pd./Pf .(69)
3 3 3 3
(1.615) (.365)
The t-test values are in parentheses ‘
^indicates significance at 5$ level .
The number of observations for equations l.A and l.B is 12 while that 
of equations 2.A and 2.B is 10. .
Sj (60-66) and S_. (66-71) are the import substitution in industry j during 
1960-66 and 1966-71 respectively.
Uj (62) is the effective tariff rate of industry j for 1962
/Pf (69) is the nominal implicit rate of protection in industry j for 1969. 
j j •
R2 = .508
= k.66
R2
F « 3.3.7
pvr 22 '.389
F =r 2.23
R2 ,291
F = 1.87
margins for 19('j9 were not significantly related tc import substitution 
during 1966-71. A tentative explanation for this may be that by the 
beginning of the period import substitution in some industries was 
almost complete and further growth in output could only come from an 
expansion in demand. This means that the given level of price-cost 
margins would not lead to any further import substitution. In fact the 
very low coefficients of import substitution of these industries during 
the 1966-71 period may explain the negative sign of the regression coefficient 
of the price-cost margins.
5.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I have examined the effects of protection and 
price- cost margins on import substitution industrialisation. For this 
purpose several regression models were tested, in linear and logarithmic 
forms. I first used the nominal and effective tariffs for 1962 to explain 
import substitution during the I96O-66 period. The results suggested 
that neither the nominal nor the effective tariffs were significantly 
related to import substitution. Following this the nominal implicit 
rates of protection for 1966 and 1969 were used; but the results obtained 
were not much better. Some explanations for the poor performance of the 
protection measures were discussed. The market structure of industries 
where a few firms dominate may mean that resources do not respond to 
the price changes caused by protection. Again the nominal implicit 
rates may also be affected by the existence of a high level of excess 
capacity in domestic industry which tend to raise production costs and 
this tends to lead, through the cost plus margin system of pricing,
tested. The results showed a significant relationship between price- 
cost margins for 1962 and import substitution during I96O-66. The 
result being somewhat better in the linear than in the log linear equation.
Finally, an examination of the combined effect of protection " 
and price-cost margins on import substitution was made and the results 
of the multiple regression tests did not significantly improve the 
explanatory power of the model. The effective tariffs remained not 
significant while the price-cost{margins remained significant.
CHAPTER VI
The Theory of Immiserizing Growth - A Survey
6.1 INTRODUCTION:
Proponents of free trade have traditionally viewed protection
as a policy that causes misallocation of resources and thus constituting
an impediment to economic development. The costs of protection have
(1)been analysed in terms of production cost and consumption cost.
The production cost is the extra cost of producing the additional amount
of the protected output, while the consumption cost is the loss of
consumer surplus arising from the tariff induced rise in price.
On the other hand, a number of development economists,
(2)
notably Prebiscl> consider import substitution industrialisation 
to be the principal policy that developing countries could implement 
to promote economic development and improve the standard of living 
of the people. Import substitution industrialisation may increase 
real income in the long run even though in the initial stages such 
production might be less efficient than in the industrailised countries: 
the argument is that although the protection will initially cause a 
loss of welfare in terms of the production cost and consumption cost 
these losses may be offset by the benefits of protection-induced . 
technical progress and factor accumulation.
(1) See W.M. Corden, "The Calculation of the Cost of Protection", 
Economic Record, XXXIII, No. 64. (May 1957), pp 29-51; and
H.G. Johnson, "The Cost of Protection and the Scientific Tariff", 
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXVIII, No. 4, August 1960, 
pp 327-345.
(2) R.Prebisch, Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries,
American Economic Review, 1959, XLIV, pp 251-73 .
(3) Other economists have also argued that protection (prohibitive 
tariffs), in the presence of distortio^ary wage differentials 
will increase economic welfare. See E. Hagen, An Economic 
Justification of Protectionism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. LXXII, No. 4, Nov. 1958, pp 498-514, reprinted in
' Economics of Trade and Development, James Theberge (ed) ,
John Wiley and Soms Inc., 1968, pp 376-393.
in Iraq, import substituting industries have been encouraged
since the end of the Second World War, and more so since the 3.958
( 1)Revolution by various policy devices. In view of the welfare loss
that may have been entailed by protection we need to examine what policies 
should now be followed. It may be said at the outset that, since 
industrialisation is an objective desired by successive governments, 
the policy prescription of free trade is not a politically relevant one.
The more likely policy oriented question is whether technical progress 
should be encouraged in these industries.
(2)Some recent analysis by H.G. Johnson and J. Bhagwati 
suggested that technical progress in the presence of protection and 
often distortions may reduce real income of the country. At first 
sight this would imply that Iraq's industries should not be encouraged 
to introduce cost-saving technical progress. However in some ways 
the Johnson-Bhagwati analysis built on the assumption of perfect 
competition may not be very appropriate for an analysis of the Iraqi 
situation where prices and output levels are administratively determined: 
one implication of this is that technical progress may not necessarily 
lead to a change in price and output. This suggests the need for an 
alternative analysis of the effects of technical progress. Before 
proceeding to that I will briefly survey the literature on the 
Johnson-Bhagwati type analysis.
(1) See Chapter II »
(2) H.G. Johnson, 'Tariffs and Economic Development', Journal of 
Development Studies, Oct. 1964, pp 3-29; H.G. Johnsoh, 'The 
Possibility of Income losses from Increased Efficiency or factor 
accumulation in the Presence of Tariffs, Economic Journal, 1967, 
pp 151-154;
J. Bhagwati, 'Distortion and Immiserizing Growth: A generalisation, 
Review of Economic Studies, Vo. 35, Mo. 104 (Oct. 1968) pp 481-85, 
reprinted in Bhagwati, Trade, Tariffs and Growth, Essays in 
International Economics, Weidenfield and Nicolson (second impression), 
1972, pp ' t
6.2 THS THEORY - BHAGV7ATI- JOHNSON ANALYSTS
H.G. Johnson shows that technical progress in a protected 
import competing industry may lower the real income if "the reduction 
in the cost of currently produced import-substitutes is more than 
outweighed by a consequent further replacement of imports by higher~ 
cost domestic substitutes." ^
Within a general equilibrium framework, Johnson's analysis 
(2)
was presented as follows:  ^ In Figure 6.1, TT' is the transformation . 
curve. II is the international price ratio and MM (and M 'M ') is: 
the tariff distorted domestic price. Points P and C show the production 
and consumption equilibrium situations under the tariff.
(3)Now if neutral technical progress takes place in Y 
industry and transformation curve will shift outward to, say, TT'1 
and the new equilibrium production point will be P'.
(1) H. Johnson, Tariffs and Economic Development, op. cit., p.27 .
He used a partial equilibrium model in this study to show the 
relevant costs and benefits resulting from technical progress 
in a protected industry.
(2) See H. Johnson, The Possibility of Income losses ... op. cit. 
pp. 152-53.
(3) Neutral technical progress means that at existing relative factor 
prices, the new technique has the same capital-labour ratio in 
equilibrium as the original one. Considering two industries 
namely textiles (capital intensive) and wheat (labour intensive) 
R. Findlay and H. Grubert have shown that neutral technical 
improvement in textiles will lower the capital labour ratio in 
both commodities - if the product price ratio is to remain 
constant after technical improvement - and the output of wheat 
will decrease and that of textiles will increase. See R. Findlay 
and H. Grubert, "Factor Intensities, Technological Progress and 
the Terms of Trade," Oxford Economic Papers, 1959, pp. 111-21, 
reprinted in J. Bhagwati (ed) International Trade, Selected 
Readings, Penguin Economics, 1969, pp. 327-340.
io
Now if, as shown in Figure 6.1, point P1 lies to the left of II ^
the utility level will be lower than before the technical progress.
For a small enough degree of technical progress in industry Y the
country must be made worse off, while with a large enough degree of technical
progress it must be made better off, by technical improvement.
Johnson explains the possibility of this outcome by pointing
out that, whereas technical progress increases the potential output
per head it also shifts resources towards the industry in which progress
occurs: if the technical progress is in the import substitute industry
the latter effect entails a loss from the excess cost of additional
protected production, which may more than absorb the increase in potential 
(2)
output per head. ■ r . ■
It is interesting to consider as to what happens if the
production of industry Y is not allowed to change following the
(3)technical improvement m  that industry. In this event the resources
saved in Y would be transferred to industry X (the exportable). Thus, 
as shown in Figure 6.1, the production point will move from P to, say,
P", on the new transformation curve. As the new production point P" 
lies to the right of II (the international price line) the utility 
level will be higher after technical progress than before, and the 
new consumption point will.lie along I'I1 indicating a higher level 
of consumption.
(1) The position of P' (whether it lies to left or to the right of
II) depends on the rate of tariff, the extent of technical progress 
and the elasticities of substitution between the factors in the 
two industries, see Johnson, "The Possibility of Income Losses 
from Increased Efficiency or Factor Accumulation in the Presence 
of Tariffs", op. cit., p. 153.
(2) H. Johnson, ibid., p. 153
(3) If prices are administratively determined then technical 
improvement in an industry may not lead to a change in the price 
and thus the output of that industry may remain constant in spite 
of the technical progress.
The analysis was also extended to deal with the case of 
factor accumulation. II. Johnson argued that an increase in the stock 
of the factor used intensively in the protected industry would shift 
the transformation curve outward throughout its length;' but the new 
production point would in this case also have to be to the north-west 
of the original production point. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, 
where the transformation curve shifts outward from TT to T !T', due to, 
say, capital accumulation in industry Y (the capital intensive).
As a result production shifts from P to a point north-west, entailing 
the possibility of loss or gain of real income. If, as in Figure 6.2, 
the new production point is P1 on I’I’ (i.e. to the left of II) then 
the new utility level will be lower than before capital accumulation.
It may also be said that if the output level in industry Y was not allowed 
to change then the new production point may be P" which entails a 
higher utility level.
Johnson's analysis is in fact an example of the phenomena of
(2)
'immiserizing growth1 first introduced by Bhagwati. According to , 
Bhagwati, growth in the presence of any distortions may reduce 
welfare. This possibility he calls immiserizing growth; the reason 
for this result is that the gain from growth is outweighed by the 
additional loss due to the distortion. Bhagwati illustrated his
(1) See H. Johnson, ibid, p. 153.
(2) See J. Bhagwati, "Immiserizing growth: a geometrical Note", 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 25., No. 68 (June 1958), 
pp. 201-5, reprinted in Bhagwati, Trade, Tariffs and Growth, 
Essays in International Economics, Weidenfield and Nicolson 
(second impression), 1972, pp. 325-331. In this Bhagwati shows 
that growth in a large country (with monopoly power in trade) 
may reduce the real income through a deterioration in the terms 
of trade.
*c.
(1'general proposition with reference to a number of examples.' ' The
case that is most relevant for our purpose is when technical progress
occurs in the presence of a distortion in the factor market.
A wage differential will shrink in the production possibility
curve and results in a non-tangency between the commodity price ratio
and the feasible production possibility curve. In Figure 6.3, TT'
is the shrunk in production possibility curve. The wage differential
operates against commodity X (the exportable). p0^ 0 as grven
international price ratio. The initial production and consumption
points are Pqc q respectively. If neutral technical progress takes
place in industry Y (the importable) then the output of X will fall
and that of Y will rise as shown by the shift of the production point
P (to the left of P C ). The production point will shift to the left 
n o o
of P C if the loss in the output of X is large enough. The consumption 
o o
possibility line will become pncn' an(^  as a result, consumption at
(2)a point such as will yield a lower level of welfare.
If we assume that, following the technical improvement in
industry Y, the output of Y is not allowed to change, then, as was
shown in earlier cases, the production point will move to the east of
P , and we get an expansion in industry X while the output of industry Y
(3)
will be unchanged. This will result in a higher level of utility.
(1) J. Bhagwati, "Distortion and Immiserizing Growth: A generalisation", 
op. cit., pp. 332-337. Bhagwati considered two cases: first, the 
case of distortionary wage differentials in a small country,
the second is that of tariffs in a large country with monopoly 
power in trade.
(2) J. Bhagwati, ibid, pp. 333-34.
(3) See Figure 6.2, for illustration.
\ /
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6.3 OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS:
There have recently been more contributions to the theory
of irnmiserizing growth. T. Bertrand and F. Flatters have provided
a more elaborate treatment to the conditions under which Johnson's
type of immiserizing growth may arise. Considering the case of capital
accumulation in a tariff protected industry (i.e. the capital intensive
industry) they show that Johnson's result depends on both the degree
of factor substitutability and the extent of the difference in factor
intensities in the two sectors of the economy.^ A necessary
condition for capital accumulation under a tariff to be immiserizing,
state Bertrand and Flatters, is that the slope of the Rybczynski line
must be less (in absolute terms) than the slope of the international
price line since consumption possibilities will then be less than in
(2)a pre-growth situation. They also state that given the above
necessary condition is satisfied, immiserization will not occur
unless "the increase in the tariff is sufficient to cause the R line
to rotate so that its percentage change from free trade be at least
as great as the percentage difference between its free trade slope and
(3)that of the international price line." This is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for immiserization.
(1) See T.J. Bertrand and F. Flatters, "Tariffs, Capital Accumulation 
and Immiserizing Growth", Journal of International Economics,
1971, pp 453-460.
(2) Bertrand and Flatters, ibid, p. 454. The Rybczynski line is 
defined as the output expansion (contraction) locus as the 
endowment of one factor is changed (the other remaining fixed) 
with constant prices, footnote 2, same page. - The slope of the R 
line will be less steep than the international price line if 
"the elasticity of factor substitution in the capital intensive 
sector weighted by its competitive share is greater than the 
elasticity of factor substitution in the labour intensive sector 
weighted by its competitive capital share", p. 457.
(3) Ibid.
Others have also contributed to the theory of irnmiserizing growth,
Batra and Pattanaik have shown that under certain conditions an
improvement in the terms of trade may lead to lower rather than higher
real income.^ A more precise condition for this result to hold was
provided, in a later study, by Batra and Scully. They have shown that
it is only when the wage differential works against the importable that
(2)an improvement in the terms of trade may worsen welfare.
In a very recent contribution, Bhagwati considered the
applications of his general theory of immiserizing growth (1968) to
show that the 'Paradoxes' i.e. the results of Johnson, Batra-Pattanaik
and Batra-Scully are all special cases within his general theory of
(3)immiserizing growth which states that if growth takes place in 
a country characterised by a distortion then immiserizing growth can 
ensue.
(1) See R. Batra and P. Pattanaik, "Domestic Distortions and the Gains
from Trade", Economic Journal, Vol. 80, No. 319, Sep. 1970,
pp. 639-49. These conditions are the existence of inter-industry 
wage differential that leads to a reversal in the pattern of trade.
(2) See R. Batra and G. Scully, "The Theory of Wage Differentials
Welfare and Immiserizing Growth", Journal of International 
Economics, 1971, pp 241-247.
(3) J. Bhagwati, "The Theory of Immiserizing Growth: Further 
Applications", Michael B. Connolly and Alexander Swoboda (eds) 
International Trade and Money, 1973, London George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., pp 45-54.
CHAPTER VII
PROTECTION AND IMMISERIZING GROWTH - SOME THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS
7.1 Introduction:
The purpose of this chapter is to build upon the Immiserizing
Growth analysis of Bhagwati and Johnson in order to make the analysis^
more appropriate for a less developed country such as Iraq. Firstly,
as pointed out in Chapter I, most manufacturing industries in Iraq
are dominated by a few firms; competing imports are subject to strict
quantitative controls and tariffs. Thus there is often a substantial
margin between average cost and ex-factory price. Moreover, and this
is important for the present study, there is the possibility that technical
progress may not lead to a fall in price, nor to any change in the
level of imports. Secondly, we make recognition of the possibility
that technical progress is not an exogenous variable. In the context
(2)6f a developing country it may require a deliberate policy effort.
Thus in evaluating the technical progress we should ask not only
whether it increases/decreases welfare but rather whether it is
preferable to an alternative strategy. One way of making such a
comparison is to consider the welfare cost/benefits of obtaining
the additional supplies (i.e. the increase in demand following the
(3)fall in price) through imports.
(1) These analyses were made within a general equilibrium framework 
with free trade and competitive domestic markets so that technical 
progress leads to a decrease in price.
(2) In Bhagwati and Johnson’s analysis, technical progress seems to 
take place automatically and spontaneously.
(3) This strategy ignores the balance of payments or foreign exchange 
availability considerations.
In order to examine the effects of technical progress in an 
industry on the welfare of the country, a partial equilibrium model 
is used. I will begin with a simplified model based on the following 
assumptions; some of the assumptions will be relaxed later on.
1) The industry uses a single variable factor to produce the 
output i.e. we assume a constant cost curve over the range of change 
considered.
2) Imports are totally prohibited by quantitative controls.
3) The price is set above variable costs at a level that secures 
some desired level of profit margin.
4) There is no distortion in the economic system.
7.2 Technical Progress with only One Input. The Case of Self-sufficiency
In Figure 7.1, DD* is the domestic demand curve for the
industry's output. The domestic cost of inputs per unit of output
is T^e price is set equal to OP^ and so output is OQ^. The
domestic price is higher than the corresponding world price OP ;
w
the reason for this may be either a desire to earn a high unit profit
or the use of inefficient technology that causes the costs per unit
output to exceed the world price. It will be seen that the effect
of technical progress on welfare will depend on which of these two
influences is dominant.
Now suppose that technical progress is promoted. ^  The
per unit input requirement and so the unit costs are reduced to, say,
01^,. Now if the price is not allowed to fall the country gains
from the savings in the cost of inputs on the initial level of output,
as shown by the area 1^ DE » However, it. is unlikely that the
price will be kept constant. After all one possible reason for
promoting technical progress may be to expand demand.
(1) Unlike Bhagwati-Johnson!s models where technical progress seems 
to be autonomous or spontaneous, in our model it is a policy 
variable. In a developing country the government plans to bring 
about technical progress by promoting general and specific skills 
through technical and vocational training and on the job training.
o
Suppose then that the price is allowed to fall to OP^, 
so demand increases by 2^ 2* T^^ -s hring an increase in consumer
surplus shown by AB P^i* On the other hand, the expansion in the 
output will require additional resources shown by the area '.
Now the question is whether the costs of these additional resources 
outweigh the abovementioned gains: if the costs are greater real 
income will decrease; it is in this sense that the technical progress 
may be said to be immiserizing.
The change in welfare consists of the following:
(7.1) A «tl = Acs +AKp
where: ^ W  = the change in welfare due to technical progress
tk CS = the change in consumer surplus
= the change in producers profits.
In terms of Figure 7.1, we have
(7.2) A  Vtf, = (PACP ' + ABC) + (P *BFI ' - P,ADlJ 
^  tl d d d d d d
(7.2.a) = ABC + I,DEI ' + CBFEd d
The fall in the price brings about an increase in welfare, and the
welfare gain is greater in this case than that of a constant price.
Thus the country get a gain from technical progress. Note that
ABC + CBFE = (ABQ^Q^ - EFQ^C^) and this is equal to the difference
between the change in utility and the change in social cost of production
of the additional output. The other component (I _DEI ') is the sociald d
benefit from the savings on resources due to technical progress.
The promotion of technical progress, however, requires some 
of the country's scarce resources and entails additional costs to 
the economy. As the additional output (supply) can be obtained through 
imports instead of through technical progress, thus the welfare change 
resulting from technical progress (expanded domestic output) must be 
compared with the welfare change if the additional supplies were obtained 
through imports. If the welfare gain from the increased domestic output 
exceeds that of imports then technical progress increases economic welfare.
ATCp
The amount can imported at the world price OPw .
The government imposes an import duty to bring the price of imports 
up to that of domestically produced substitutes. The government 
obtains tariff revenue equal to CBIJ on imports of CBQ^Q^, to raise 
their price from OPw to the level of domestic price OP^ .i • .Thus the 
domestic price is kept above the import price OP^ . by the margin P<^ PW -
The change in welfare from this alternative policy is denoted by
(7’3) ml = ^ CS - 4 0 V + k <3R.
where GR is the government revenue from tariffs, and the other
variables are as defined in equation (7.1). Producers profits are
reduced due to the fall in the price with costs being unchanged.
In terms of Figure 7.1, the welfare change will be
(7.4) ^  Wml = PdACPd' + ABC - PdACPd‘ + CBIJ
(7.4.a) = ABC + CBIJ
Now, cojnparing the welfare change under the two policies i.e. equations 
(7.2.a) and (7.4.a) we have
(7.5) K  W _  - K  VI . = I DEI * + (CBFE - CBIJ) ^  0tl ml d d
Technical progress and price decrease increases welfare more than 
would additional imports if ^  A sufficient condition for
^  Wtl^Wml is tliat CBFE ^  CBIJ. It can be shown that CBFE CBIJ
(1) Proof: As the diagram in Figure 7.1 is drawn we have
(i) CBFE - CBIJ' >  ' 0
Now add and subtract the area CBQ^Q^ to get
(ii) CBFE - CBIJ + CBQ2Q1 - C B Q ^  0
partial cancellations between the first and the fourth terms 
and the second and the third reduces (ii) to
(iii) QjJIQj - JIFE >  0 >
This can be expressed in a different form as
(IV) Qiq2 (Qij -QXE)S CiQ2; (dpw  - oia M  >  o
The term on the left hand side of (iv) is greater than zero,
and for the sign of the whole equation to be positive we must have
OP - 01 ’ >  0w d
Therefore CBFE >  CBIJ if OP S  01,'.^ w f ' d
It is interesting to note that the relationship between
OP and 01_1 and therefore the possibility of immiserizing growth, 
w d
is related to the effective rate of protection. In the traditional
effective protection theory, within a perfect compel.ition model,
when the value of inputs ^ .aij exceeds the price P . - all valued at world
i
prices - and so the value added at world prices is negative, then, 
technical progress (or expansion in output of the industry concerned) 
reduces real income. An analogous result is obtained in our work, 
that is, if the (social) .price cost margin is negative '
(?Tsj = Pj " ? ci3 <  0) i.e. the social cost of production^Ecij 
exceeds the world price P then technical progress will reduce real 
income and the possibility of immiserizing growth will arise.
7- 3 Technical Progress and Welfare - The Case of Non-Self-sufficiency 
In this model we allow for competing imports. As was 
explained in Chapter II, when the authoroties in Iraq deemed that 
domestic production capacity was not sufficient to meet the 'estimated1 
local demand, imports were permitted under a quota; local demand was 
estimated as an average quantity of production plus imports over the 
last two or three years.(2)
In Figure 7.2 DD' is the domestic demand curve for the product.
As inhthe previous diagram, 01^ is the domestic cost of inputs per 
unit of output. The price is set equal to however, domestic output
is assumed to equal only OQ^ and the gap is filled by imports, equal 
Q]Q.2 ‘ T -^e import price OP^ is lower than the domestic price.
The domestic market price of the imports has to be made equal to that 
of the domestic product; I assume that this is done by a tariff.
An alternative method is to let quota holders get the profits, though
this is not the case in Iraq.
(1) In terms of the Soligo and Stern measure a negative value added
at world prices implies an effective protection tariff greater
than one.
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Now suppose that technical progress lowers the unit cost of
inputs to, say, I.-,'* H*© welfare effect depends on whether or not
the price is reduced. If the price is not lowered, then, there is a
gain from the savings in resources on the initial level of output
shown by the area I , F E I .
J d d'
Suppose, however, that the price is allowed to fall to,
say, OP ,, domestic demand increases by Q9Q.J let this be met entirely
Q  ^^
by increased home production ^  ^2^ 4  ^' T^e c*ian9e -*-n welfare
resulting from technical progress and the reduction in the price is 
given by
< 7 - 6 > A W t 2  =  k C S  +l^ p  '  k G R
In terms of Figure 7.2, we have
(7-7) &  Wt2 = P(JRBPd , + d^FEX^, + IJHE - PdDIPd .) - DACI
with cancellation of some terms the above equation becomes
(7.7.a) = ABC + I FEI , + IJHEd d
Once again the fall in the price brings about an increase in 
welfare and this gain is greater in this case than that of a constant 
price. Provided that world price exceeds the social cost of production - 
as is depicted in Figure 7.2 - the country gains from technical progress. 
In this as well as in the previous case, the welfare change from 
technical p r o g r e s s i s  given by two elements:
a) the difference between the utility and the Jk social cost and
b) the social benefit from the savings in resources.
(1) The equality between the change in demand and the change in output 
(i.e. Q.Qn = h°l^s °nly If imports are constant.J. J M  i
bO
As for the alternative policy where the additional demand 
is met by imports, the welfare change will be
!7-8) = ^ CS "A77p +
In terms of Figure 7.2 this will be
(7.9) K W „ = P .ABP , - P DIP + (IBKL - DAML)*-* m2 d d' d a'
(7.9.a) = ABC + D#CI + CBKM - D#CI
(7.9 .b) = ABC + CBKM
A sufficient condition for the welfare gain to be greater if
the additional supplies are obtained from domestic output is that 
&  Wt " &  wm >  °/ that is
(7.10) ABC + IPEI . + IJHE - ABC - CBKM V  Od d '
As CBKM = IJNL (because Q1Q3 = ^2Q4) then, equation (7.10)
reduces to
(7.10.a) I FEI , + LNHE > > 0d d' *
For this relationship to be greater than zero i.e. for technical 
progress to increase real income, the area LNHE must be greater than 
zero, and this will be so if and only if the world price of the commodity 
concerned exceeds the social cost of production.
It is interesting to note that the final results of the 
welfare changes in both cases of self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency 
are the same i.e. in both cases the superiority of technical progress 
over the alternative policy of imports is determined by the relationship 
between world price and the social cost of production, and the 
benefit from the savings of resources brought: about by technical progress.
7.4 Technical Progress when the Inputs are subject to Distortion - 
The Case of Self-Sufficiency
I now extend the previous models to allow for distortions
in the factor market and/or taxes ont the firm's inputs. In either
case the effect is to cause the marginal cost to the industry i.e.
the private marginal cost, to exceed the social marginal cost.
In Figure 7.3, DD' is the domestic demand curve for the
industry's output. The private cost of inputs per unit of output is
01, while the social cost is 01 . Suppose that the price is set 
d w
equal to DP^; output will be OQ^. The import price OP^ is lower than
the domestic price; imports are prohibited administratively.
Now suppose that technical progress reduces the cost
per unit output to, say, the price is not allowed to fall
the industry gains from the savings in the cost of inputs. In addition,
if the excess of private over social costs was due to the labour
market distortion the labour units will be worse off; in the case of
a tax on inputs the government will suffer a loss 6f revenue.
Denoting either of these losses by GR, the welfare effect for the
country as a whole is
(7.1X) £  wt3 =£JVp - A ®
In terms of Figure 7.3 the change in welfare is
(7.12) A W n  = IFKI , - (I,FJI - I KHI ,)
*■* t3 d d' d w d' w'
The component in brackets in the above equation i.e. the tax revenue
cion the inputs used in producing 0Q_ , can be written as (I'FKI.)  --- — ,
1 d d 1 + d
where d is the rate of t a x ^  and is equal to 01 d QIw . Thus equation
01w
(1) We arrive at this term as follows:
The change in private cost due to technical progress is I In , and
-d^d' *
its social counterpart is ^ • TheJ^GR per unit equal (01 (d)
X  + d w
-01 , (d)) or I I . d and this is equal to Id ^ d' .d. The change 
w w w 1  + d
in GR from the whole output will be I did1 OQ., d , which is equivalent
d X 1 + d
to the area I _FK I    ^ •
a a* 1 + d
{ o
(
i
w
(7.12) will be
i  + a ;
(7.12.b)
1 I JH I
d* 1 + a w w
This is the social benefit from the savings of resources brought about
This result shows that the welfare change from technical progress -
when the price remains constant - is not affected by the existence
of distortion. In both cases- with and without distortion - the
welfare change is given by the social benefit from the savings of
resources, namely, (I_ FE I _, in Figure 7.2 and I JH I , in Figure 7.3)d d w w _
All that distortion does is to enlarge the private benefit from the 
savings of resources, but the social benefit is the same in both cases.
Next suppose that technical progress is accompanied by a 
fall inthe price to, say, 0P^/f* demand will increase by 
consumer surplus will increase by AB The change in welfare is
In terms of Figure 7.3, the welfare change is given by
(7.14) A Iff. = (P, AC P^. + ABC) + (CBGK + I FK I . -t4 d d* d d ’
P, AC P,,) + /KGIH - (I FJ I - I , KH I ,)/
d d' d w d1 w —
The last term in the square bracket on the right hand side represents
the change in the tax revenue and consists of two parts: KGIH is
the increase in revenue from tax on the inputs used to produce the
additional output (QnQ^), while the component (I. FJ I - I _. KH I ,)12 d w d' w 1
consists of the reduction in revenue on the inputs used to produce the 
original level of output. Expressing this latter component in terms 
of d, the rate of tax (or distortion), in the abov» equation will be
by technical progress (as opposed to the private benefit 1^ FK T^,)•
(7.13) & wt4 = A c s  +&TVp + A ®
(7.15) = Ea iiC?,, + ABC + UK*. •
4- KGIH - I „ FIy  td d ! 1 + d
*1
(7.15.a) = ABC + CBGK + KGIH + I, FK I_, Ta a 1 -r a
Once again we getJ^W^ equals the difference between the 
^  utility and ^  social cost, plus the savings in resources . Note 
that the welfare change ( is independent of the rate of distortion (d) 
Thus whereas in our model the welfare change or the possibility of 
immiserizing growth is independent of the rate of distortion, in 
Bhagwati-Johnson*s model (s) the possibility of immiserization is 
related:to the extent of distortion.
We now compare the welfare change from technical progress 
with what this welfare change will be if the additional supplies had 
been met by imports. The welfare gain in this latter policy is
(7.16).: A  Wm3 = & C S  +-&GR
Here, producers profits are reduced due to the fall in the price.
&  GR consists of tariff revenue. In terms of Figure 7.3, the above
equation will be
7.17) A W ,  = P, A0 P , + ABC - P A0 P + CBLM
■ w  m3 d d1 d d 1
A sufficient condition for the welfare gain from technical 
progress to be greater than that of the alternative policy of imports 
is that
(7.18) ABC + 'CBGK + KGIH + I „ FK I ■ , - ABC - CBLM 0a d1 1 + d i r ­
on Q, LMO V, Q HI £1 i.e. the world price must be higher than the
1 ~2 1 2
social cost of production. As the diagram is drawn this inequality 
is satisfied, and expansion of output in this industry increases welfare 
by more than would imports.
7.5 Technical Progress when the Inputs are subject to Distortion - 
The Case of Non —Self —s * * f f i. ciency
In this case competing imports are introduced into the 
model and the industry is assumed to use one variable factor input 
that is subject to distortion.
Upon analysing this model in the same manner as was done 
in previous ones, I have found that the overall result given by this 
model is exactly the same as obtained by the other models. In this 
model - as in the others -- I have found that the sufficient condition 
for growth to increase real income is that the world price must 
exceed the social cost of production. This is a general result that 
is applicable to all the models considered so far. Another general 
result, that is obtained from this as well as the other models, 
is that the welfare effect of technical progress - when accompanied 
by a price reduction - and its superiority over the welfare gain from 
the alternative policy of imports, is given by two components: one, 
is the social gain from the savings in resources 011 the original 
level of output, the other is the social profitability (i.e. the 
difference between the social cost of production and the cost of 
imports of the additional output.
In all the four models analysed so far I have assumed only 
one factor input for the purpose of simplification. Some people 
may criticise this assumption on the ground that it is far from reality. 
On closer examination it turned out that the number of inputs in the 
model does not make any difference to the analysis and to the final 
result. In fact I have used the model to analyse the case of two 
inputs, namely materials and labout inputs, and the final results were 
found exactly the same as in the cases of one input.
7.6 The Differences Between Our Model and Bhagwati —Johnson 1s
In the end, it is interesting to point out the differences 
between the results of my model and the Bhagwati-Johnson model (s).
Firstly, while in Bhagwati-Johnson's model technical progress 
is necessarily accompanied by a fall in price and a consequent increase 
in output, which may or may not result in a welfare loss; in my 
model in the case where the price remains constant and output does 
not change and therefore technical progress necessarily increases 
welfare. The policy implication from this is that, when the social 
cost of production is found to exceed the world price it would be 
more beneficial to the country to keep price unchanged after technical 
progress rather than to lower it. Secondly, whereas in the Bhagwati- 
Johnson model the possibility of immiserizing growth is related to 
the extent of distortion in the factor market in my model the rate 
of distortion plays no such role. In fact, in my model, the welfare 
effect of technical progress is also independent of the level of 
distortion in the commodity market Xi.e. tariffs on commodities) 
and in this respect, the model differs from that of J o h n s o n a s  
well. Finally, because of the existence of administrative pricing 
and profit margins, the comparison in our model is between import 
price and the social cost of production rather than between the 
relative prices of imports and domestic output as it is the case with 
Johnson's model.
(1) In Johnson’s model the possibility of immiserizing growth due
to technical progress increases with higher rates of tariffs on 
the output. Johnson's model differs from Bhagwati's in that it 
does not assume any distortion in the factor markets.
In the perfectly competitive models of Bhagwati and Johnson
technical progress is treated as exogenous. However, in our model it is
a policy variable endogenous to the firm or business unit. As recent
developments in economic theory point out technical progress in large firms
is a policy variable and is treated endogenously. If the firm's level
of technology is related to its expenditure on Research and Development
(R & D) the firm would minimise its total cots (including its expenditure
on R & D) of producing any output by choosing the appropriate combinations
of the conventional inputs and the technology inputs; as usual the optimality
condition is that the marginal productivity of the last dollar spent on
any input must be the same for all inputs. ^  This view emphasises that
technology is not a free good. The incentive to invest in R & D, it is
argued, is greater at larger outputs "essentially because a given increase
in the marginal productivity functions would apply over more units of the
(2)
conventional inputs at larger output."
This latter view of technical progress seems more appropriate 
to our model. In Iraq the government promotes training in general and 
specific skills: the National Development Plan of 1970-74 specifically 
stresses the need to "raise the level of productivity in the various 
branches of industry by expanding the training programmes and improving
(3)
the quality of output as well as the method of production".
In the private sector, on the.: other hand the promotion of 
technical progress is decided by the individual entrepreneurs who are 
presumably motivated by the prospects of raising productivity and, in 
turn, profitability.
(1) See G.S. Becker, Economic Theory, Alfred. A. Knopf, New York, 1971 
pp 129-134
(2) Ibid., p. 133
(3) The National Development Plan 1970-74, Law No. 70 of 1970, Iraqi 
Gazette, No. 1862 of the 1st April, 1970, p. 133 (Arabic).
7.7 Empirical Investigations of the Welfare Effects of Industrial 
Growth in Iraq
As shown earlier in this chapter, growth in protected industries 
will reduce real income if the marginal social cost of production exceeds 
the world price of the product. We now examine whether this possibility 
may arise in Iraq's industries. For brevity we will refer to such 
industries as Real Income Reducing (R.I.R.) Industries. The magnitude 
of the problem will be judged by examining the proportion of Iraq's 
manufacturing output that is produced in such industries. As most industries 
produce a number of products and, correspondingly, as the relevant data 
is available on an industry basis only the R.I.R. criteria will be taken
as
* *
j
C. *> X 
3 ^
*
where C. is the (total) social cost of production of the j'th industry and. 
*
X. is the value of its output at 'world prices' . The social cost of 
*
production, C_. / is given by
(7.20) C. = T* M. . + W. + K.
D 3 3
* thwhere M is the cost of the i material input used per unit output of
th *
the j' industry (expressed at 'world prices'), W. the social cost
3
•k
of labour and K_. is the social cost of capital.
The value of the output and of material inputs at 'world prices'
were estimated by deflating the corresponding domestic values by the
(1)nominal tariffs for 1962. Our investigation relates to 1962; this year was 
chosen due to reasons of data availability. The investigation covers some 
21 industries which account for about 40 per cent of total output of large 
scale manufacturing. The social cost of labour is the labour input 
multiplied by the shadow price. As there is no available data for the 
shadow price I decided to make three estimates based on plausible 
assumptions: a) the shadow price of unskilled labour is one-half that of
(1)' An alternative method of estimating the values of output and inputs
would be to use the nominal .implicit rates as deflators. However, the 
lack of data on prices for 1962 made this task very difficult.
the market price; b) that the shadow price of both skilled and unskilled
(1)labour is one-half of the market price and c) that the shadow price
of labour - both skilled and unskilled - is equal to the market price.
The social cost of capital is not likely to diverge much from the private
cost: this is because almost all capital goods are imported and there are
only very low import duties or taxes on these inputs. I, therefore, used
(2)
the data on depreciation allowances as indicating the social cost of capital 
The estimates for the values of output at 'world prices’ and the 
alternative measures of the social cost are shown in Table 7.1. If the social 
cost of labour is estimated from assumption (a) above twelve of the twenty 
one industries fall within the R.I.R. category; these account for about 
38 per cent of output of the industries in the sample. In comparison, 
if the social cost of labour is estimated by assumption (b) the number of 
R.I.R. Industries falls to eight and the share is reduced to about 22 per 
cent. Finally, with assumption (c) i.e. there is no distortion in the 
labour market the number of R.I.R. industries increases to thirteen and 
their share in total output rises to about 39 per cent.
It is interesting, at this point, to compare these results with 
those of an alternative test. Using the traditional model of protection
/9\
and assuming no distortion in the labour market, H. Katrak showed 
that the R.I.R. phenomena may arise if the effective rates of protection
(1)Little, Scitovsky and Scott suggest that it would seldom be easy to 
justify a shadow wage of much less than half the actual wage in the 
less developed countries.' See Little, Scitovisky and Scott, Industry 
and Trade in Some Less Developed Countries, op. cit., p. 146
(2)In fact data on the depreciation allowances exist only for 1969.
The corresponding figures for 1962 were estimated on the assumption 
that the proportions of depreciation allowances to gross output were 
the same in 1962 as those in 1969. The depreciation figures for 1969 
were obtained from the Industrial Development Survey, C.S.O., Report of,' 
the Second Stage, Summary vol, June, 1971
(3)See H. katrak, "The Possibility of Real Income Losses from Technical 
Progress in Protected Industries, The Case of Pakistan," Journal of 
Development Studies, 1971, pp, 161-72,
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TABLE 7.1
Output at 'world prices' and the Social Cost of Production 
in Selected Industries, 1962
l^ooci) T!)
No. INDUSTRY
Output
*
X.
3
Social
a
Cost of 
*
C.
3
b
Production
c
1 Dairy products 437 736 693 754
2 Macaroni 66 46 43 48
3 Sugar manufacturing 853 1041 975 1048
4 Biscuits 527 1005 961 1037
5 Vegetable oils & soap 6828 5630 5448 5728
6 Cotton Textile 3144 2619 2336 1927
7 Woollen Textile 1325 1377 1228 1481
8 Rayon Textile 827 962 833 1014
9 Vests and socks 306 290 279 308
10 Jute Textile 307 190 ,168 193
11 Knitted Clothing 205 236 223 239
12 Footwear 1732 1760 1513 1768
13 Carpentry 499 622 527 644
14 Paper and products 563 653 631 654
15 Tanning 877 902 852 936
16 Matches 14981 2318 2065 2400
18 Tiles 831 679 543 639
19 Asbestos 316 228 216 239
20 Cottong gining 2138 2119 2104 2133
21 Glass and products 11 15 13 16
Notes: X* = output at 'World prices" is obtained by deflating the domestic
values by the nominal tariffs ; C* I = the social cost of
production: ^
a) where the shadow wage of unskilled workers is half the money wage
b) the shadow wage of both skilled and unskilled workers is half the 
money wage and
c) the shadow wage of all types of workers is equal to the money wage.
Sources: For the computation we used the basic data at domestic prices
in the Industrial Census for large scale manufacturing, 1962,
CSO, Ministry of Planning
(the Soli go and Stern version) is greater than 50 per cent.^ Using this 
criteria, we found that in a sample of 21 industries in Iraq, the share 
of R.I.R. industries in total output is about 53 per cent. This suggests 
that the R.I.R. phenomena appears more serious when the effective tariff 
criteria is used. Since Katrak's test assumes no distortion in the 
labour market the relevant comparison is with estimate (c) of our model: 
the share of R.I.R. industries suggested by the former test exceeds that 
by the latter by 14 percentage points,(or about 36 per cent). The difference 
between these results arise due to the different features of the two models. 
In the model of administrative pricing prices are substantially above the 
long run average cost and thus enables producers to obtain above normal 
profits. In contrast, in the effective protection model, with its 
assumption of perfect competition, the price is equal to the marginal 
cost and only normal profits are obtained by the producers. In other 
words whereas in the former model the relevant comparisons are between 
the social cost of production and world prices, in the effective protection 
model the comparison is between domestic prices and world prices.
On a priori basis it is not clear which test is more appropriate. 
However, as the results of the regression analysis in Chapter V showed, 
a model that incorporates the price-cost margins explains industrial 
growth better than the standard model of effective protection. On 
that basis we may argue that our model is a more appropriate guide to
the importance of the R.I.R. problem. However, this does not mean that the
problem of potential welfare losses is not a serious one for Iraq. In
order to illustrate this let us assume that a given increase in productivity
in an R.I.R. industry causes an equi-proportionate fall in welfare and 
that the productivity increase in a non-R.I.R. industry causes an equi- 
proportionate increase in welfare. Suppose now that there is a 10% increase-
(1) Or greater than 100 per cent by the standard version of the effective 
rate of protection.
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in productivity in all industries. Then using our estimate (c), i.e. 
that 39 per cent of output is produced in R.I.R. industries, we find that 
the net change in national welfare will be only 2.2 per cent,^ i.e. a 
10% increase in productivity in all industries enables welfare to increase 
by only about a quarter of that. (Using estimate (b) of R.I.R. output the 
welfare increase would have been about 4.4 per cent).
It should be emphasised that our model has assumed constant
returns to scale in production. Allowing for the possibility of economies 
of scale may reduce the likelihood of welfare loss from technical progress 
in the protected industries. This is because, in addition to the gain from 
the downward shift of the supply curve, the increase in output resulting 
from the technical progress would in turn lead to a reduction in the average 
cost. In other words, the saving in resources would be greater than that 
implied by the alternative assumption of constant costs. Unfortunately 
data unavailability made it difficult to investigate the importance of this 
problem.
The policy implications of these results are two-fold. First, 
output in the R.I.R. industries should not be allowed to expand until the
technical progress brings the social cost of production at least equal to 
the world price of competing imports; the government should be encouraging 
firms to lower the cost of production in such industries. Secondly, for 
future industrial development greater care should be taken in the choice 
of industries: more emphasis should be given to economic criteria and only 
the industries which have greater prospects of being internationally 
competitive should be selected and encouraged.
(1) If the share of R.I.R. industries in total output is 38 per cent then 
given a 10% increase in productivity in-, all industries the net change 
in the overall productivity of all industries will be 62% - 38% = 24% 
of the 10 per cent or 2.4 per cent.
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Statistical Note to Appendix -Tables
Data that follows relate to prices, output, imports, nominal 
tariff rates, effective tariff rates, import substitution, price-cost 
margins etc. The sample size and industrial coverage varies from one 
table to another due mainly to the data constraint. When estimating the 
various measures we have tried to cover as a larger samples as possible 
within the available data.
DOMESTIC AND WORLD PRICES OF SELECTED MANUFACTURED 
PRODUCTS IN IRAQ, 1966 AND 1969
(Iraqi Dinar per unit)
NO. INDUSTRY 1966
P P 
d f Pd
1969
P_
r
1 Sugar refining (T) 57 25 77 33
2 Canning (T) 190 85 284 131
3 Woollen Textiles (M) .1.100 .567 1.344 .546
4 Dairy products (T) 540 295 386 249
5 Beer (T) 249 185 282 212
6 Paper and products (T) 170 135 128 121
7 TV and Radio (E) 51 41 86 37
8 Veg. Oils and Soaps (T) 183 161 176 145
9 Cotton Textiles (M) 0.140 0.138 0.115 0.120
10 Domestic Utensils (T) 311 421 345 653
11 Cigarettes (T) 719 996 858 1551
12 Asbestos (T) 49 72 51 81
13 Macaroni (T) 167 270 98 215
14 Footwear (P) 1.077 2.516 1.308 2.196
15 Cement (T) 5.4 13 7.4 14.8
Notes: P^ = domestic price at ex-factory prices
i.e. excluding indirect taxes on output
Pf = world (import) price, at c.i.f.
(T) = Ton; (M) = Meter; (E) .= each; (P) = pair
Sources:
P^, is derived from the Indus trial Census, 1966 and 1969, 
CSO, Ministry of Planning
P , is derived from the Exports and Imports of Iraq,
Ministry of Planning, 1962-1969. Also Foreign Trade 
Statistics, 1966 and 1969, CSO, Ministry of Planning
TABLE (A.4.2)
SALES, MATERIALS AND LABOUR COSTS AND THE PRICE-COST MARGINS 
FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1962
(OOO)ID
NO. . INDUSTRY X.
3
(1)
M. .
13
(2)
W .
3
(3)
(1)-(2+3) 
(4)
7Vj
(4) / (1)
(5) %
1 Dairy products 795 539 118 138 17.4
2 Macaroni 66 46 11 9 13.6
3 Sugar . 1503 1100 143 260 17.3
4 Biscuits & sweets 1645 1253 152 240 14.6
5 Veg. oils & soap 8057 6333 561 1163 14.4
6 Cotton textiles 3778 1621 1024 1133 30.0
7 Woollen textiles 1882 805 507 570 30.2
8 Rayon textiles 1263 731 363 169 13.3
9 Vest & socks 437 254 59 124 28.4
10 Jute 377 131 52 194 51.4
11 Knitted clothing 269 230 32 7 2.6
12 Footwear 2529 .1438 511 580 22.9
13 Carpentry 707 378 234 95 13.4
14 Paper & products 675 541 46 . 88. 13.0
15 Tanning 1225 798 168 259 21.1
16 Cosmetics 83 . 50 4 29 34.9
17 Cement 5531 1732 670 3129 56.6
18 Cottong ginning 2138 1887 57 194 9.1
Notes: Xj = sales in industry j; M
ij
= material costs, including electricity,
fuels and lubricants;-W' = labour cost i.e. the wage bill in industry j ant
’K'j = Price-Cost margin in industry j.
Source:
Compiled from the 'Monthly Industrial Census for 1962', Industrial 
Statistics Department, C.S.O., Ministry of Planning, Iraq, 1964.
TABLE (A*4 ,3)
OUTPUT, IMPORTS AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN
SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN IRAQ, 1960
NO. INDUSTRY X
(1)
M
(2)
Z
(3)
X/Z
(4)
1
CONSUMERS
Dairy products 298 538 836 0.356
2 Canning (veg & fruit) 699 699 0.000
3 Veg. Oils & soap 7152 2175 9327 0.767
4 Sugar manufact. 1365 8022 9387 0.145
5 Alcoholic bevs. 558 19 577 0.967
6 Cigarettes 4851 93 4944 - 0.981
7 Cotton Textiles 4927 5136 10063 0.489
8 Woollen Textiles 1722 1501 3223 0.534
9 Rayon Textiles 1221 6867 8098 0.151
10 Knitted clothing 657 755 1412 0.465
11 Footwear 2619 422 3041 0.861
12 Wood & furniture 2307 3450 5757 0.401
13 Cosmetics 83 213 296 0.280
14 TV & Radio 2315 2315 0.000
15
INTERMEDIATE
Jute 360 1499 1859 0.194
16 Paper & products 623 2641 3264 0.191
17 Pharmaceuticals 66 3000 3066 0.022
18 Paints - 1335 1335 0.000
19 Fertilizers 34 34 0.000
20
INVESTMENT
Glass & products - 1087 1087 0.000
21 Cement 4873 187 5060 0.963
22 Tiles 619 2 621 0.996
23 Machinery - 5688 5688 0.000
24 Tractors & agricul­
tural equipment - 1309 1309 0.000
25 Asbestos 248 65 313 0.902
Notes: X = output at factor cost prices for both large and small scale
industries; M = imports at c.i.f„ prices and Z = total supply,
i.e. output plus imports 
* Output figures for 1960 were originally given at market prices 
thus we have deducted the indirect taxes from the industries 
concerned to get them at factor cost prices
Sources: 1) Output - form the MOnthly Industrial Survey for 1960, CSO,
Ministry of Planning, Iraq, after deducting the excise taxes on
the output of the industries concerned. For some industries 
we have used the Input-Output table for Iraq, 1960, by 
T. Kanaan
2} Imports-from the Foreign Trade Statistics, I960, CSO,
Ministry of Planning, Iraq.
TABLE (A.4.4}
DOMESTIC OUTPUT/ IMPORTS AND TOTAL SUPPLY
IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN IRAQ, 1966
NO. INDUSTRY X
(1)
M
(2)
Z
(3)
X/Z
(4)
CONSUMPTION GOODS
1 Dairy products 1494 1226 2720 0.549
2 Canning 118 1266 1384 0.085
3 Veg. oils & soaps 10552 31 10583 0.997
4 Sugar manufacturing 3123 4065 7188 0.434
5 Alcoholic bevs. 2364 155 2519 0.938
6 Cigarettes 7156 409 7565 0.946
7 Cotton Textiles 7982 7211 15193 0.524
8 Woollen textiles 2667 820 3487 0.765
9 Rayon textiles 1715 9065 10788 - 0.159
lO Knitted clothing 1697 1527 3224 0.526
11 Footwear 4724 34 4758 0.993
12 Wood & furniture 5103 4112 9215 0.553
13 Cosmetics 148 136 284 0.521
14 TV & Radio 238 1667 1905 0.125
INTERMEDIATE GOODS
15 Jute & bags 672 419 1091 0.616
16 Paper & products 2035 4604 6639 0.306
17 Pharmaceuticals 170 6137 6307 0.027
18 Paints 296 907 1203 0.246
19 Fertilizers - - - -
INVESTMENT GOODS
20 Glass & products 58 1318 1376 0.042
21 Cement 6863 248 ■ 7111 0.965
22 Tiles 1054 98 1152 0.915
23 Machinery - 12390 12390 0.000
24 Tractors & agricul­
tural equipment - 3580 3580 0.000
25 Asbestos 471 117 588 0.801
Note: Definition of variables as in Table (A.4.3)
Source: Output and Imports are from the Demand Analysis for Manufacturing
Industries in Iraq, 1964-1980, Industrial Department, Ministry 
of Planning, Part III, Documentation, Baghdad, July 1971
TABLE (A.4.5)
OUTPUT, IMPORTS AND TOTAL SUPPLY IN SELECTED
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN IRAQ, 1971
(OOO) ID
NO. INDUSTRY X
(1)
M
(2)
Z
(3)
X/Z
(4)
1
Consumer Goods 
Dairy products 4551 1340 5891 0.772
2 Canning 2202 500 2702 0.815
3 Veg. oils & soaps 19426 76 19502 0.996
4 Sugar manufacturing 8328 11303 20741 0.402
5 Alcoholic beverages 7883 174 8057 0.978
6 Cigarettes 10651 77 10731 0.993
7 . Cotton textiles 11082 5870 16952 0.654
8 Woollen textiles 4041 340 4381 0.992
9 Rayon textiles 9946 8750 18696 0.532
10 Knitted clothing 2460 400 2860 0.860
11 Footwear 6042 10 6052 0.998
12 Wood & furniture 7187 4490 11677 0.615
13 Cosmetics 388 1410 1798 0.216
: 14 TV and Radios 1317 554 2171 0.607
15
Intermediate Goods 
Jute and bags 1754 891 2645 0.663
16 Paper & products 2814 5000 7814 0.360
17 Pharmaceuticals 1680 7729 9409 0.179
18 Paints 657 1266 1923 0.342
19 Fertilisers 1184 750 1934 0.612
20
Investment Goods 
Glass and products 507 2130 2637 0.192
. 21 Cement 11109 380 11489 0.967
22 Tiles 1878 152 2030 0.925
23 Machinery 6598 20480 27078 0.244
24 Tractors etc. 3117 10470 13587 0.388
25 Asbestos 1291 141 1432 0.902
Note: Definition of variables as in Table (A.4.3).
Sources: Output - Industrial Survey 1971, CSO, Imports-Foreign Trade
Statistics, CSO, Ministry of Planning, 1971.
TABLE (A.4.6)
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN IRAQ INDUSTRIES 
1960-1966
(000)ID
NO. INDUSTRY L  x
(i)
(U2'U1)Z2 . 
(2).......
(2) / (I)
(3) ....
1
Consumer Goods 
Dairy products 1196 525 0.439
2 Canning 118 118 1.000
3 Veg. oils & soaps 3400 2434 0.7159
4 Sugar manufacturing 1758 2077 1.182
5 Alcoholic beverages 1806 -73 -0.040
6 Cigarettes 2305 -264 -0.115
7 Cotton Textiles 3055 547 0.179
8 Woollen Textiles 945 805 0.852
9 Rayon Textiles 494 86 0.175
10 Knitted clothing 1040 197 0.188
11 Footwear 845 461 0.545
12 Wood & furniture 2796 1401 0.501
13 Cosmetics 65 68 1.053
14 TV and Radio 238 238 1.000
15
Intermediate Goods 
Jute 312 460 1.476
16 Paper & products 1412 763 0,541
17 Pharmaceuticals 104 32 0.303
18 Paints 296 296 1.000
19 Fertilisers 000 OOO 0.000
20
Investment Goods 
Glass & products 58 58 1.000
21 ‘ Cement 1990 14 0.007
22 Tiles 435 - 93 -0.215
23 Machinery 000 000 0.000
24 Tractors & agr. 000 000 0.000
25 Asbestos 223 5 0.024
Source: Computed from Appendix tables (A.4.3) and (A.4.4)
Notes: X = the change in gross output between 1960 and 1966
(U^ - = Total import substitution in absoiute values.
TABLE (A.4.7)
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN IRAQ INDUSTRIES 
1966-71
(OOO)ID
NO. INDUSTRY A  x
(i)
(V U1)Z2
(2)
(2)/(l)
(3)
1
Consumer Goods
3057 1314 0.429
2 2084 1972 0.946
3 8874 - 3 -0.0003
4 5205 -664 -0.128
5 5519 315 0.057
6 3495 504 0.144
7 3100 2187 0.705
8 1374 688 0.501
9 8231 6974 0.847
10 763 955 1.252
11 2578 30 0.012
12 2084 724 0.347
13 240 -548 -2.285
14 1079 1046 0.969
15
Intermediate Goods
1082 124 0.115
16 779 422 0.542
17 1510 230 0.152
18 361 184 0.509
19 1184 1184 1.000
20
Investment Goods
449 396 0.882
21 4246 23 0.005
22 824 20 0.025
23 6598 6598 1.000
24 2130 2130 1.000
25 820 144 0.176
Source: Computed from Appendix tables (A.4.4) and (A.4.5)
Note: Definition of terms is as in Table A.4.6
TABLE (A.4.8)
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN IRAQ INDUSTRIES 
1960-71
NO. INDUSTRY A  x
(i)
(V U1)Z2
(2)
(2) / (1) 
(3)
1
Consumer Goods
4253 2451 0.576
2 2202 2202 1.000
3 12274 4466 0.358
4 6963 5330 0.765
5 7325 89 0.012
6 5800 794 0.137
7 6155 2797 0.454
8 2319 1700 0.733
9 8725 7123 0.816
10 1946 1301 0.669
11 3423 829 0.242
12 4880 2499 0.512
13 305 -115 -0.377
14 1317 1317 1.000
15
Intermediate Goods
1394 1241 0.890
16 2192 1321 0.603
17 1614 1477 0.915
18 657 657 1.000
19 1184 1184 1.000
20
Investment Goods
507 507 1.000
21 6236 46 0.007
22 . 1259 -144 -0.183
23 6598 6598 1.000
24 2130 2130 1.000
25 1043 158 0.151
Source: Computed from Appendix tables (A.4.3) and (A.4.5)
Note: Definition of terms is as in Table A.4.6.
NO
1
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3
4
5
6
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9
10
11
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TABLE (A.4.9)
OUTPUT, MATERIAL AND LABOUR INPUTS AND
PRICE-COST MARGINS FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES f 1969
(OOO) ID
INDUSTRY X.
3
(1)
M. .
13
(2)
W j
(3)
TTj
o
Dairy products 2668 1506 334 31
Canning 529 331 101 18
Veg. oils & soaps 6574 8146 1135 44
Sugar manufacture 5455 3534 240 31
Cigarettes 7222 4463 1297 20
Cotton textiles 4904 1960 1737 25
Woollen textiles 3500 1921 930 19
Rayon textiles 2702 1589 651 17
Jute textiles 947 478 229 25
Footwear 3579 1639 858 30
Paper & products 2024 1266 175 29
Cement 8442 3051 1117 51
Asbestos 917 281 141 54
Radio & TV 354 236 32 24
Vests & socks 877 548 145 21
Knitted clothing 1024 613 152 25
Tanning 1705 1150 252 18
Matches 825 397 171 31
Tiles 1217 607 369 20
Carpentry 707 390 290 3
X = output in industry j, M . . inputs i used in production
j
of commodity j; Wj ~ wa9e bill in industry j and = price-cost 
margin in industry j.
All at domestic market prices
Computed from the Industrial Survey 1969, CSO, Ministry of Planning
Import Substitution and Protection 
Measures for Selected Industries
(1) (2) C3) CD
NO. INDUSTRY
S. %  
C60-66)
t. (62)
%
U C62)
J
%
mij/X
* C62>
1 Dairy Products k k 83 125 .05
2 Sugar refining 118 77 71 .12
3 Veg. Oils and 
Soaps
72 80 95 A O
k Cotton textiles 18 21 " 2 k .19
3 Woollen textiles 83 k 2 k 3 .19
6 Rayon textiles 18 53 '61 .19
7 Jute textiles 1^8 23 26 .39
8 Knitted clothing 19 32 57 .21
9 Footwear 55 76 65 .05
10 Wood & products 50 k 5 k 8
11 Paper & products 3 k 20 7 3 .63
12 Cosmetics 105 75 73 •l*f
Sources: columns Cl)-C3) from tables CDl) and CDD;
column CD derived from the Input-Output table for Iraq 1962.
Notes: S_. = import substitution; t.. = nominal tariff rate;
U. = effective rate and ]>.mij/X. is the imported input 
3 }* 3
coefficient, i.e. the ratio of imported inputs to output,
TABLE (A.5.2.)
Import Substitution, Nominal Implicit Rates 
of Protection and Price-cost Margins
No. INDUSTRY S. (66-71) 
3
%
t .(66)
3
t (69)
tJ
TV .(69)
J
1 Dairy Products 43 83 55 51
2 Sugar -12 128 138 31
3 Veg oils & soaps 1 lZf 21 .44-
4 Cotton textiles 71 1 -13 23
3 Woollen textiles 30 146 19
6 Footwear 1 "37 -42 30
7 Paper products 54 30 6 29
8 Canning 93 123 117 18
9 Asbestos 18 -32 -38 . 54
10 Radio & TV 96 24 132 24
-
Sources: Tables (4.2), (4.4) and (A.4.9)
Note: t. = (?"d. - p i J / f . i.e. the nominal implicit rate of
J 3 0 0
protection. .
TABLE (A.5.3)
Price-Cost Margins and .
Import Substitution, selected industries
No. INDUSTRY 7T  (62)
j
Cl)
S. (60-66) 
0
(2)
1 Dairy products 1 7  A k k
2 Sugar 17.3 118
3 Veg oils & 
soap
l*f.*f 72
k Cotton textiles 30.0 18
5 Woollen textiles 30.2 33
6 Rayon textiles 13-3 17
7 Jute 51.^ 1^8
8 Knitted clothing 2.6 19
9 Footwear 22 i 9 33
10 Wood & prod. 13.^ 50
11 Paper & prod. 13.0 5^
12 Cosmetics 3 ^  9 105
Sources: column (l) : from Table C-.3) - 
column (2): from Table (^ f.^ f).
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